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Youngstown Revisited
by CHRISTOPHER BRYANT AND CARL TOBIAS'
One half century ago, President Harry S. Truman promulgated
an Executive Order that authorized federal government seizure and
operation of the nation's steel mills to support United States participation in the Korean conflict. 1 The president relied on his power as
commander-in-chief of American armed forces, other executive
authority provided by Article II in the United States Constitution, the
need for sustaining the American military effort, and temporal exigencies. Eight weeks later, the United States Supreme Court held
that Truman lacked any power to seize the property of American
steel companies in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 2
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated
an Executive Order that authorized trial by military commissions of
non-United States citizens whom the American government suspects
of terrorism in domestic cases and concomitantly denied these persons access to the federal courts. 3 Bush, like Truman, premised this

*Faculty Members, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. We wish to thank Tom Baker, Ben Bateman, Margo M. Lambert, Bruce Markell,
Tom B. McAffee, Briant Platt and Peggy Sanner for valuable ideas, Angeline Garbett and
Genny Schloss for processing, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors
that remain are ours.
1. Exec. Order No. 10340 (directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession
of and operate the plants and facilities of certain steel companies), 17 FED. REG. 3139
(Apr. 10, 1952).
2. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL
SEIZURE CASE (1994); Grant McConnell, THE STEEL SEIZURE OF 1952 (THE INTERUNIVERSITY CASE PROGRAM NO. 52, 1960); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME
COURT 76, 151-92, 220, 273 (2001); ALAN F. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE (1958).
3. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Bush Order]. See also Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1
(Mar. 21, 2002) at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mcol.pdf [hereinafter
DOD Order].
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action on executive power, namely his authority as commander-inchief, the necessity to wage the war against terrorism following the
September 11 attacks, and time restraints.
The respective presidential initiatives five decades apart can be
distinguished. For instance, the chief executives addressed discrete
factual scenarios, which created distinct national emergencies. Careful scrutiny, however, reveals that the two endeavors are in fact
strikingly analogous. For example, both the Truman and Bush efforts
raised profound separation of powers concerns. Both presidents resorted to their executive authority derived from Article II as justifications for extraordinary domestic actions, when fighting undeclared
"wars." The leaders, therefore, exercised legislative power in derogation of the Constitution's express proviso that assigns Congress, not
the president, lawmaking responsibility.
The specific Bush Administration claim to executive authority
would prescribe federal court jurisdiction, an enumerated power that
Articles I and III confer on Congress in explicit terms, while it would
proscribe even threshold judicial consideration of the initiative's constitutionality. This assertion of authority is at once unsupported, imperial, and sweeping. Indeed, the November order could undermine
not only legislative, but also judicial power, and, thus, jeopardize the
finely wrought balance among the federal government's tripartite, coequal branches. Because the Bush endeavor more substantially invades Congress' province and concentrates federal authority in the
president than the corresponding Truman Administration action,
Youngstown applies with greater force to the fundamental questions
the recent initiative presents.
These propositions mean the Executive Order issued last November 13, 2001 warrants analysis through the prism of Youngstown
on the landmark decision's fiftieth anniversary. Our article undertakes this effort and ascertains that the president has no power to bar
those individuals who are covered by the Bush Order from invoking
4
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
We first explore the origins and development of the critical is4. Litigation challenging detainment or military trials outside the United States may
raise additional statutory and constitutional issues that are beyond this article's scope. See
infra note 10 and accompanying text. See also John Mintz, Qatar Lawyer Builds Case for
Detainees At Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, May 13, 2002, at A3 (discussing litigation
challenging detainment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). See generally Law and
the War on Terrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399-834 (2002); Neal K. Katya! &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE
L.J. 1259 (2002).
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sues, which implicate the Constitution, judicial jurisdiction, and interbranch authority. The section assesses relevant constitutional text,
applicable history, and governing Supreme Court case precedent. It
finds that specific language in the Constitution bestows on Congress,
rather than the chief executive, almost plenary power to establish the
federal courts and to delineate their jurisdiction.
The article next evaluates legal measures that responded to the
September 11 terrorist strikes. Our focus is the USA PATRI OT
ACT and the Bush Order for which we survey considerable background information. Illustrative are the statute's legislative history as
well as pronouncements related to the enactment and the November
order by legislators, the Chief Executive, and Cabinet members, including Attorney General John Ashcroft and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld.
The third part examines the "police action" in Korea during the
early 1950s. We canvass numerous presidential administrations' requests that Congress authorize executive branch seizure of various
industrial enterprises as a technique for settling labor-management
disputes and review ways in which lawmakers treated these overtures.
This segment then analyzes the Truman Administration order that
seized the steel mills. The portion ends with an assessment of the Supreme Court opinion in Youngstown, which invalidated the seizure,
and the meaning subsequently accorded that crucial decision.
Section four applies Youngstown to the November Executive
Order and ascertains that the directive is unconstitutional, insofar as
it precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction granted by
federal statute. President Bush's claim of power usurps legislative
authority that the Constitution explicitly reserves for Congress: the
political branch Articles I and III power to establish the judiciary and
designate its jurisdiction.
The article concludes by urging the Bush Administration not to
invoke the Order's provision that purportedly eliminates any federal
court scrutiny of, or intervention in, detainment or trials authorized
by the directive. We believe that this assertion of power would erode
legislative and judicial authority, upsetting the meticulously calibrated
equilibrium among the federal government's three coordinate
branches.

I. Article III, Constitutional History and the Jurisdictional
Question
Section 7(b) of the November 13, 2001 Executive Order provides
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in pertinent part that the "military tribunals [established by the directive] shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by" any
person subject to the Order, who:
shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or
proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of
the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any
foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal. 5
The directive's expansive terminology sweeps within the compass of
its prohibition all courts - federal, state, foreign, or international apart from the military commissions created by the Order itself. Our
focus is the Bush Administration's attempt in section 7(b) to strip
federal courts of jurisdiction granted by statutes that implement Article III of the Constitution. 6
Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction and may
adjudicate a dispute only when Congress expressly empowers them to
do so and, therefore, differ from state courts, which are presumed to
enjoy general jurisdiction.7 Federal courts have jurisdiction solely
over those "Cases" and "Controversies" specified in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. 8 Moreover, this constitutional enumeration is not self-executing; a federal statute must explicitly authorize the exercise of federal judicial power. 9 Thus, insofar
as particular cases or controversies that implicate the Bush Order

5. Bush Order, supra note 3; see also infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (assessing Bush Order).
6. Therefore, we do not evaluate the legality of the Order's attempt to deprive state,
foreign, or international courts or tribunals of power to accord those individuals whom the
directive covers relief. The Supreme Court sharply limited the ability of state courts to
grant people in federal officers' custody relief in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397, 412 (1872).
See also McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. 598, 605 (1821) (denying state courts the power to
issue writs of mandamus to federal officers). See generally MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 156-64 (2d ed. 1990); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 41 (6th ed. 2002); Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347-59 (1930).
7. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 257 (3d ed. 1999); LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 125 (1973); RICHARD POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS 296 (1996); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
207 (3d ed. 2000); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, at 27.
8. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR.
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 (5th ed. 2001); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 385; WRIGHT &
KANE, supra note 6, at 61-62.
9. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1988). See also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 258; JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 913 (3d ed. 1999); REDISH, supra note 6, at 25.
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might, for whatever reason, exceed the scope of any legislative jurisdictional grant, the section 7(b) prohibition on federal court jurisdiction's exercise is mere surplusage. 10 Therefore, our concern is with
the category of lawsuits for which federal statutes provide federal
courts with jurisdiction, but which section 7(b) purports to insulate
from any judicial scrutiny. Of course, the administration officials who
drafted the Bush Order must have intended to affect precisely that
group of cases by mentioning "any court of the United States" in section 7(b).
Whether a federal court retains jurisdiction, even to consider a
covered individual's request for any form of relief, in exactly such a
suit - in other words, whether section 7(b) fails in its apparent purpose - is a question that a federal judge must address at the litigation's
outset, regardless of how strong the case is on the merits. As the Supreme Court recently admonished the lower federal courts, "[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the
United States' and is 'inflexible and without exception."' 11 The Court
stressed that, absent subject matter jurisdiction, a federal judge lacks
authority to resolve on the merits even the clearest legal issue:
"Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,
the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact

10. Thus, even if, as we argue below, Bush had no power to proscribe federal court
jurisdiction, federal courts may lack jurisdiction to address claims raised by or on behalf of
some persons subject to the Order. Cf Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 968 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (reversing district court finding that no federal court had statutory jurisdiction
to entertain habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of German nationals accused of war
crimes and held in custody by U.S. military in Germany). Whether denial of any judicial
remedy would violate Article III or the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is a separate issue beyond this article's scope. Id. at 967 (finding unconstitutional withdrawal of
statutory authorization to grant writ), rev'd, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790-91
(1950) (denying relief without clarifying whether petitioners' custody was lawful or simply
beyond federal court scrutiny). See also Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002)
(reading Eisentrager to preclude jurisdiction to entertain petitions for the writ of habeas
corpus filed by detainees held by the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba): RICHARD
H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 365 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; WRIGHT & KANE, supra
note 6, at 47, 298; Jordan P. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality,
23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 23-25 (2001); Wayne E. Thomas, Note, Federal Courts-Habeas
Corpus - Jurisdiction, 28 TEX. L. REV. 727 (1950).
11. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting
Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). See generally TRIBE, supra
note 7, at 389; Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235 (1999).
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and dismissing the cause." 12 For these reasons, whenever a person affected by the Bush Order asks a federal court for relief from any action taken pursuant to the directive, the federal judge who receives
the person's plea must determine whether section 7(b) deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction it would otherwise exercise pursuant to federal legislation that implements Article III, Section 2 in the
Constitution. Although section 7(b) purports to strip courts of jurisdiction, we conclude below that the Bush Order unconstitutionally intrudes upon the province of Congress, at least to this extent.
Thus, in any case in which individuals whom the directive governs invoke federal court jurisdiction, most probably under the statutes empowering federal judges to grant the writ of habeas corpus in
broadly defined classes of cases, 13 the federal courts must consider the
question that we address here, notwithstanding the relative merits of
any claims for relief asserted. Because the issue presented by section
7(b) concerns the courts' subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore,
requires threshold resolution, the arguments we elaborate below to
support our conclusion that section 7(b) is unconstitutional must be
assessed independent of certain controversial, ongoing debates.
These debates include those concerning the extent of constitutional
rights possessed by non-United States citizens, 14 the Bill of Rights'
12. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex Parte Mccardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869)).
The Supreme Court explained:
Much more than legal niceties are at stake here. The statutory and (especially)
constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation
and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times,
and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.
For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or
federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court
to act ultra vires.
Id. at 101- 02 (citations omitted).
13. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2241-55 (1994); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1337-467;
JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1998); IRA ROBBINS, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKLISTS (1998); TRIBE,
supra note 7, at 300; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, at 352-69. See generally Mintz, supra
note 4, at A3 (discussing pending litigation).
14. Compare TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS 10 (Jan.
4, 2002) available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf [hereinafter ABA
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS] (Aliens present in the United States, even unlawfully,
are entitled to due process), with Griffin Bell, The Constitution Doesn't Protect Foreign
Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2001, at A20 (stating "Supreme Court has not decided
definitively whether illegal aliens are protected by the Fourth Amendment"). See also
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 968-73; Kenneth Anderson, A Qualified Dffense of Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 590, 611-13 (2002); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
STAN. L. REV. 953, 978-88 (2002); Philip Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in
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applicability to persons accused of committing war crimes, 15 whether
the Order "suspend[s)" the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus"
and, if so, whether the rigorous conditions in Article I, Section 9,
Clause 2 are satisfied. 16 Similarly immaterial to our contentions are
whether the substantive commands of the Bush Order, as distinct
from section 7(b)'s attempt to abrogate the federal judicial power, receive support under World War II .precedents, such as Ex Parte
Quirin, 11 or fail the test enunciated by the Reconstruction Era ruling
Ex Parte Milligan. 18 It warrants emphasis that the Court, in both
cases, exercised federal judicial authority and resolved challenges to
the constitutionality of presidential orders on the merits - performing
just the kind of judicial scrutiny of executive action that section 7(b)
19
of the Bush Order attempts to preclude. Our thesis is that, despite
the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441 (2002); Paust, supra note
10.
15. Compare ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 10 (noncitizens, whether "lawfully in the U.S., are entitled to [] Fifth and Sixth Amendment
[rights] before criminal penalties may be imposed"), with Bell, supra note 14 (asserting
that "counter-foreign terrorism, as distinct from law enforcement, is not generally subject
to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment"). See also
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 299-300; Anderson, supra note 14, at 613-31; CRIMES OF WAR:
WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 130 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999); Winging
it at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at A28 [hereinafter Winging it at Guantanamo].
16. ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 11 (finding Bush Order
to "not expressly suspend" habeas corpus writ and opining that it is "most unlikely that it
could."); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 289-90 (2001); Richard Fallon, Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1070-71 (1998); Gerald Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
961, 969-87 (1998); Gerald Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1964 (2000).
17. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See also Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteurs' Trial, 11 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 131 (1943); Daniel J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996);
George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635, 640-42 (2002).
18. 71 U.S. 2 (1866). See generally CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 182-252 (1971); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 369; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259 (6th ed. 2000); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 299.
19. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25; Milligan, 71 U.S. at 109-17. See also Viet Dinh, Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 405-06
(2002). The proclamation in Quirin resembles§ 7(b). Compare Proclamation No. 2561, 7
FED. REG. 5101 (1942), with Bush Order, supra note 3, § 7(b); see also Noah Feldman,
Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 471 (2002). Some reason that Quirin's merits resolution of saboteurs' claims shows § 7(b) is unconstitutional,
and, thus, deserves only cursory analysis. See ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 11; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 4, at 1263 n.12, 1281-84. We also find§ 7(b)
unconstitutional, see infra text accompanying notes 250-67, but the issue requires thorough
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section 7(b), the federal courts, and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, can exercise judicial power and decide on the merits
these and other constitutional issues raised by the Order's substantive
provisions. We do not, however, address how the courts should resolve any of these merits issues. Accordingly, we do not contend that
the Bush Order's authorization of detention and military trial of covered individuals necessarily violates the Constitution in every, or even
in any, instance.
The remainder of part I briefly reviews the constitutional text,
history, and caselaw establishing that Congress, not the President, is
the political branch of the federal government that the Constitution
empowers to prescribe federal court jurisdiction. Neither our conclusion nor its support is at all novel or controversial; to the contrary, the
proposition is uncontested. Nevertheless, a concise survey of these
arguments and their underlying substantiation is essential, as they afford one predicate for our perhaps more controversial conclusion namely, that the Constitution's express authorization of Congress as
the institution to create the federal courts and prescribe their jurisdiction by necessary implication denies this power to the President when
acting alone.
A. Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court

Beginning at the apex of the federal judicial hierarchy, Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides the categories of cases over
which "the supreme Court shall have Appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make." 20 The High Court has long held that this
analysis, as Quirin is not dispositive. The Court identified no constitutional basis to ignore
the proclamation's jurisdiction-stripping terms, and alternatively suggested the merits
holding meant it had "no occasion to decide" about jurisdiction, which the U.S. did not
contest. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. See generally Lloyd Cutler, Lessons On Tribunals-From
1942, WALL ST. J., Nov. 31, 2001, at A9; Paust, supra note 10.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Since Ex Parte Bollman, the
Court has construed federal statutes empowering it to grant the writ of habeas corpus (often called the Court's power to grant an "original" writ to distinguish this jurisdiction from
its review of a lower court through certiorari power) as creating an alternative way to review a lower court decision denying the writ. 8 U.S. 75, 100 (1807); see also Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 98 (1869) (in proper cases the Court, under the 1789 Act and all later acts
that give "jurisdiction in cases of habeas corpus may, in the exercise of its appellate power,
revise the decisions of the inferior courts of the United States, and relieve from unlawful
imprisonment authorized by them, except in cases within some limitations of the jurisdiction by Congress") (emphasis added); FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 558-618. By placing
this class of cases within the Court's "appellate jurisdiction," the Court avoided finding
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so-called "exceptions clause" of Article III authorizes lawmakers to
enact statutes denying the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
cases that the specific enumeration in Article III would otherwise include.
The Court's pathbreaking decision Ex Parte McCardle was one
of the earliest, and most dramatic, judicial articulations of this principle.21 In circumstances remarkably similar to those of today, United
States military authorities imprisoned Mccardle, who was a civilian
and a vocal critic of congressional reconstruction policy, pending trial
before a military commission.22 McCardle petitioned the circuit court
for the southern district of Mississippi, where he was detained, for a
writ of habeas corpus, and ironically invoked the February 5, 1867
expansion by the Reconstruction Congress of federal court power to
grant the writ. 23 McCardle asserted various challenges to his confinement's legality and specifically alleged that the Military Reconstruction Act, 24 which authorized trial of southern civilians before
military tribunals, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial

that a statute granting it authority to entertain an "original" petition for the writ unconstitutionally extended its "original Jurisdiction" within Article Ill's meaning. Bollman, 8 U.S.
at 101 (thus distinguishing Marbury v. Madison's conclusion that the Judiciary Act of 1789
provision empowering the Court to grant a writ of mandamus as an original matter violated Article Ill's limitation on its "original Jurisdiction"). See also HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 10, at 1340; TRIBE, supra note 7, at 268. More critical here, this same classification of the Court's power to entertain "original" petitions for the habeas corpus writ as
part of its "appellate Jurisdiction" within Article III also means that Congress' power to
make "Exceptions" to this jurisdiction apparently covers the Court's power to entertain
"original" petitions for the writ. See REDISH, supra note 6, at 27, 48; Dallin H. Oaks, The
"Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. Cr. REV. 153.
21. 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869). See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 433-514; TRIBE,
supra note 7, at 271-72; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle,
15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973).
22. 74 U.S. at 507-08. See also FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 438; Van Alstyne, supra
note 21, at 236.
23. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 507-08. The 1867 Act states in pertinent part:
[T]he several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of
such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States ....
Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at
234-36.
24. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. See also HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 10, at 1341. See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 333-43, 499-501; Stanley Kutler,
Ex Parte McCardle: Judicial Impotency? The Supreme Court and Reconstruction Reconsidered, 72 AM. HIST. REV. 835, 842 (1967).
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by an impartial jury.25 The circuit court rejected McCardle's claims,
and he appealed this decision to the Supreme Court under the terms
of the February 5, 1867 Act.
In March 1868, after the Court had heard argument on the merits
of McCardle's appeal, but before the Justices held conference on the
matter, Congress enacted a statute providing,
[S]o much of the act approved February 5, 1867 ... as authorized an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the
Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such
jurisdiction by said Supreme Court, on appeals which have
been, or26 may
hereafter be taken, be, and the same is hereby re,
pealed .
The Court stayed action on the cause and afforded the parties an opportunity to be heard on the repealer's effect. 27 Thereafter, a unanimous High Court, speaking through Chief Justice Chase, concluded it
lacked jurisdiction over McCardle's appeal.
The opinion by Chief Justice Chase for the Supreme Court was
simple nearly to the point of tautology. 28 The Chief Justice observed
that Article III granted Congress the power to make exceptions to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction and emphasized that "[i]t is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception" than the
1868 repealer. 29 Chase continued:
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power
to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dis-

25. See FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 455. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at
238.
26. Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44. See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 43966; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, at 36; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 272; Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 239-41.
27. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 509. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 241-42.
28. Chase's "opinion made it seem quite simple[, but] the issue was by no means so
simple as Chase made it appear in Mccardle." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 305 (1985). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 242-44.
29. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514; see U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 2. See generally NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 18, at 36; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 272-73.
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missing the cause. 30
The Supreme Court did precisely that, and the Chief Justice dismissed the McCardle appeal "for want of jurisdiction" after the jurist
distinguished the precedents that counsel for McCardle had proffered.31 The determination is significant for our purposes, because the
decision represents a vivid illustration of the proposition that the
Constitution vests Congress, rather than the president,32 with the
authority to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the . Supreme
Court. 33
B. Congressional Power Over the Original Jurisdiction of the Lower
Federal Courts

The first significant controversy concerning the federal judiciary
arose in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 when the delegates
debated whether it was advisable to establish inferior federal courts at
all. 34 On June 5, 1787, John Rutledge of South Carolina, who would
subsequently become one of the first United States Supreme Court
30. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 245-67.
31. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514-15. See generally FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 45556.
32. Indeed, in McCardle, the Congress had enacted the repealer over President Andrew Johnson's veto. See McCardle, 74 U.S. at 508; FAIRMAN, supra note 18, at 469; Van
Alstyne, supra note 21, at 239.
33. This idea about the political branches' relative constitutional competence is not
diminished by later judicial and academic conclusions that other portions of the Constitution restrict Congress' power to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction: See, e.g., Ex Parte
Yerger, 75 U.S. at 106 (holding.the Constitution's text and history justified a narrow construction of the 1868 repealer as affecting only appeals to the Court under the 1867 Act,
thus leaving undisturbed power to grant writ under other, prior jurisdictional grants);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871) (holding unconstitutional a statute purporting to deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction in certain cases in which recipients of
presidential pardons brought claims against the United States); cf Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948) (reasoning that Fifth Amendment due process
guarantee limits Congress' power over state and federal court jurisdiction). See also James
E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior
Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1436-42 (2000) (providing recent review of enduring
academic debate over Constitution's limits on Congress' Article III power to govern the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985); John Harrison, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 203 (1997); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Bernard J.
Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1997); Lawrence Gene Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1998).
34. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 62-66 (1966);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 2-4. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at
8; REDISH, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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Justices, opposed the creation of lower federal courts, "arguing that
the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in
the first instance[,] the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure national rights [and) uniformity" of decisions.35 The view espoused by Rutledge prevailed when the delegates
voted, 36 although James Madison of Virginia and James Wilson of
Pennsylvania had both asserted the need for lower federal courts. 37
Fortunately, this ballot did not prove to be dispositive, as Madison
and Wilson snatched victory from the jaws of defeat by immediately
proposing a compromise measure - "that the National Legislature be
empowered to institute inferior tribunals," 38 while they "observed that
there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely,
and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish
them." 39 Of course, this suggestion, thereafter denominated "the
Madisonian compromise,"40 secured the Convention's approval. The
idea is embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which
provides "The Congress shall have Power ... To constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court," and Article III, Section 1, which
states "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."41 Moreover, the nascent national
legislature promptly created the lower federal courts and prescribed
42
their jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
43
In Sheldon v. Sill, the Supreme Court concluded that the Con35. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand,
ed., 1911) [hereinafter "Farrand"]. Roger Sherman of Connecticut joined in opposing
lower courts, stressing "the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when
the existing State Courts would answer the same purpose." Id. at 125.
36. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 124-25; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 4; REDISH,
supra note 6, at 8.
37. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 125. See generally BOWEN, supra note 34, at 62-66.
38. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 125. See also IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON,
FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1950); GARY WILLS, JAMES MADISON (2002); WRIGHT
& KANE, supra note 6, at 2.
39. 1 Farrand, supra note 35, at 125; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 4.
40. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 8; REDISH, supra note 6, at 8. See generally Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 9; art. III,§ 1.
42. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 9-12.
See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1927); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
43. 49 U.S. 441 (1850). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 358-65;
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stitution's grant to Congress of the greater power to determine "from
time to time" whether any inferior federal courts should be "ordain[ ed] and establish[ed]" included the lesser power of creating
these courts but vesting the tribunals with jurisdiction over less than
all the categories of cases and controversies enumerated in Article
44
111. The High Court, therefore, upheld the constitutionality of the
section in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which precluded federal courts
from hearing cases when the diversity of the parties resulted from the
assignment of a chose in action. 45 Sill, the plaintiff-assignee, a citizen
of New York, who had sued a citizen of Michigan, contended that the
anti-assignment provision of the Judiciary Act violated Article Ill's
command that "[t]he judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to ... Controversies ... between Citizens of different States. "46
The High Court rejected this assertion and stated:
It must be admitted, that if the Constitution had ordained
and established the inferior [federal] courts, and distributed
to them their respective powers, they could not be restricted
or divested by Congress. But as it has made no such distribution, one of two consequences must result, - either that each
inferior court created by Congress must exercise all the judicial powers not given to the Supreme Court, or that Congress, having the power to establish the courts, must define
their respective jurisdictions. The first of these inferences
has never been asserted, and could not be defended with any
show of reason, and if not, the latter would seem to follow as
a necessary consequence. And it would seem to follow, also,
that, having a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have
no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers. No one of
them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclusively con- ·
ferred on another, or withheld from all. 47
Having thus demonstrated the constitutionality of the antiassignment proviso that lawmakers had included in the Judiciary Act,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court judgment for want of juREDISH, supra note 6, at 29-30; TRIBE, supra note 7, at 276; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note
6, at 47-48.
44. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-49. See also U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1; Harrison, supra note
33, at 205; Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Redirect the Jurisdiction of the
Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839, 842-44 (1976);
supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
45. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-50. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994); supra note 42.
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 193-94
(discussing Sheldon).
47. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 448-49; Rotunda, supra note 44, at 842-44.
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risdiction, observing that "the disposal of the judicial power (except
in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress. "48
This segment of the article has examined the premise for the
longstanding proposition that the Constitution entrusts the legislative
branch with authority over federal court jurisdiction, subject to certain limited restraints. Less well settled is the corollary idea that the
Constitution's grant of this power to Congress by implication denies it
to the chief executive acting without statutory authorization. The
Youngstown determination, which we discuss below in part Ill, provides the framework for analyzing presidential assertions of power to
prescribe federal court jurisdiction independent of Congress. Before
exploring that critical precedent, however, the next section summarizes the federal legal response to the September 11 terrorist attacks.

II. Federal Legal Developments In Counterterrorism After
September 11
Congress and the President have both changed federal law in important ways since September 11, 2001. This part assesses the legal
responses of the federal government's political branches to the unprecedented terrorist strikes. We generally conclude, respecting several significant issues addressed by the Bush Order, that the Administration first sought legislative authorization for its initiative, which
Congress denied, and then arrogated to itself through the November
13 Executive Order the requested power (including some authority
that it had not even pursued).
A. Legislative History of the USA PATRIOT ACT of2001

As the United States reeled from the severe blow inflicted by the
September 11th terrorist attacks and the country groped towards
equilibrium in the strikes' immediate wake, some federal legislative
action clearly became inevitable. 49 Nonetheless, there remained substantial uncertainty about what precise form the response of senators
and representatives would assume. 50
48. Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449; Harrison, supra note 33, at 205. As with Congress' power
over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the existence of constitutional limits on
how substantially Congress exercises its power over lower federal court jurisdiction does
not diminish the force of the authority demonstrating that the Constitution grants this
power to Congress, not the President. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
49. See Bush Seeks to Expand Legal Arsenal Against Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Sept.
18, 2001, at A24. See also Richard D. Parker, Homeland: An Essay on Patriotism, 25
HAR\(. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 407, 427 {2002).
50. Ted Bridis, Justice Department Asks Congress to Clear Wide Ranging
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Just over a week after the terrorists attacked the United States,
the Bush Administration submitted to Congress proposed legislation,
titled the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 ("ATA"), which addressed a
wide spectrum of issues regarding law-enforcement, immigration, and
counterterrorism efforts. 51 In the highly-charged atmosphere following the brutal strikes and amidst widespread fears of additional, even
more deadly, assaults, senators and representatives encountered extraordinary political pressure to accede to the President's suggestions.52 Indeed, the Senate had suspended the upper chamber's normal operating procedures and passed through voice-vote in a latenight session on September 13 various appropriation riders, which
granted numerous requests from President Bush for increased counterterrorism authority. 53 However, by the next week, the congressional leadership recognized the need for greater deliberation about a
number of the Administration's legislative recommendations and
scheduled hearings before the Senate and House Judiciary Committees.54
Sections 202 and 203 of the Bush Administration draft proposal
had the greatest relevance for the matters that the November 13, 2001
Executive Order would subsequently address. Section 202 would
have authorized indefinite detention of any non-citizen whom the Attorney General "has reason to believe may commit, further, or facili-

Antiterrorism Legislation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at A4; see also Kristen Choo, Controversial Cure, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 20.
51. Anti-Terrorism
Act
of
2001
(Sept.
19,
2001),
at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/ 20010919_ata_bill_draft; American Values on
Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at B16 (hereinafter American Values on Trial).
52. John Lancaster, Hill Puts Brakes on Expanding Police Powers, WASH. POST,
Sept. 30, 2001, at A6 (noting that in "days after September 11, [opinion polls showed]
Americans overwhelmingly favored stronger police powers, even at the expense of personal freedom"); Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties; Rights Groups
Unite To Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at Al 7 (reporting that on Sept. 17,
2001, the Attorney General said, "[T]errorists with links to those who committed last
week's attacks might still be operating in the United States and that a new set of counterterrorism measures is needed to address the threat"); cf Leti Volpp, The Citizen and
the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (discussing consolidation of a new ethnic
identity category, subject to widespread hatred and violence, in the wake of the September
11 terrorist attacks).
53. Krim, supra note 52; David Abramowitz, The President, The Congress, and Use of
Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (2002). See generally Parker, supra note 49, at
427; Paust, supra note 10.
54. Lancaster, supra note 52; see Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American
Values on Trial, supra note 51.
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tate acts" of terrorism, defined quite broadly. 55 Section 203 would
have vested exclusive authority to conduct federal habeas corpus review of section 202 detentions in the federal courts for the District of
Columbia. 56
Members of Congress, belonging to each major political party,57
and civil liberty watch-dog organizations58 vociferously opposed these
provisions. Lawmakers, who rejected the plain import of sections 202
and 203 in the Administration's bill, aggressively questioned those
specific provisos during the House Judiciary Committee's hearing
conducted on September 24 and especially in the Senate Judiciary
Committee's hearing the following day. Representatives Jerrold
Nadler (D-N.Y.) and Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.) both voiced "strong concern[s)" about the constitutional validity of section 202's authorization for indefinite detention. 59 Representative Nadler, in particular,
observed that the provision's low threshold - whether the Attorney
General has "reason to believe" that a non-citizen poses a threat to
national security - would render the (geographically constrained)
provision for federal habeas corpus review included in section 203 an
empty, purely "ministerial" protection against potential abuses. 60
55. See AT A, supra note 51, at § 202; see Terrorism Investigation and Prosecution:
Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2001 WL 1132689 (Sept. 25,
2001) [hereinafter Sept. 25 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing] (statement of Sen. Specter
quoting § 202 of the Administration's draft bill). See generally Harold Koh, The Spirit of
the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 34-36 (2002).
56. ATA, supra note 51, § 203. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15.
57. Krim, supra note 52. See also American Values on Trial, supra note 51.
58. Walter Pincus, Caution ls Urged on Terrorism Legislation: Measures Reviewed To
Protect Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at A22. See also Editorial: No Rush On
Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A34 (urging rejection of section "allowing indefinite detention and possible deportation of aliens on the strength of no more than certification by the attorney general," as this power must be "subject to full judicial review or the
terrorists will have succeeded already in forcing the country to retreat from its most basic
principles").
59. Draft Proposals Designed to Combat Terrorism: Hearing of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2001 WL 1132693 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter House Judiciary
Comm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Nadler) (expressing doubts about § 202, which
"would seem to indicate that the Attorney General has basically carte blanche, with only
ministerial judicial review, to put someone in jail and keep them there forever with no evidence"); id. (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court's been very
clear ... that you can't keep someone in indefinite detention and be constitutional"); see
also Koh, supra note 55, at 34-35.
60. Representative Nadler stated,
{J]udicial review [in§ 203 seems only to go to the] question of whether the Attorney General has reason to believe. And there's no standards [which seems] to
indicate that the Attorney General has basically carte blanche, with only ministerial judicial review, to put someone in jail and keep them there forever with no
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The next day, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Ma.) and Senator
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) amplified these objections when Attorney
General John D. Ashcroft appeared before the Senate Judiciary
Committee to urge swift enactment of the Administration's bill. 61 The
Attorney General insisted that the sole intent underlying section 202
was to authorize the detention of removable non-citizens while removal proceedings were pending. 62 After Senator Specter remarked
that the language in section 202 was much more expansive - authorizing the indefinite detention of any non-citizen, deportable or not 63 the Attorney General conceded the phraseology might be overbroad
and agreed to narrow the terminology and, therefore, reach only
those non-citizens whom the American government was holding,
pending their deportation under pre-existing law.
ASHCROFT: Senator, we will be happy on the language here if
it's unclear, or if we are mistaken. Our intention is to be able to
detain individuals who are the subject of deportation proceedings on other grounds to detain them as if they were the subject
of deportation proceedings on terrorism grounds, which the law
provides clearly is a mandatory detention ..
SPECTER: Well, I think the law now gives you authority to detain if you're proceeding to deport. But on this phase, it goes
evidence."
House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 59 (emphasis added).
61. Sept. 25 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 55 (statements of Sens.
Kennedy and Specter). See generally Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft's Ascent, THE NEW
YORKER, Apr. 15, 2002, at 50.

62. Attorney General Ashcroft said,
When a person is being the subject of adjudication for being deported on
grounds that are other than terrorism grounds, frequently that individual is not
detained. The provision that we have in this proposal is that if the attorney general determines that the individual meets a standard of being a threat to national
security, et cetera, when that person during the pendency of the adjudication of
deportment - being deported on other grounds - that person can be held in custody,

and that's the nature of this provision.
Sept. 25 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 55 (emphasis added).

63. Senator Specter said,
[As] to the mandatory detention of suspected terrorists, § 202 gives broader
powers than just having mandatory detention of someone thought to be a terrorist who is being held for deportation on some other lines. [It] defines detention
of terrorists, aliens, and authorizes the attorney general to certify that an alien
may be detained who he, quote, 'has reason to believe may commit further or facilitate acts described in Sections ... .' [A] number of sections are listed and they
all relate to terrorism. So that on the face of this statute it appears that the
authority to detain on that very generalized standard, without any evidentiary
base or probable cause, would be beyond somebody who is subject to deportation on other grounds.
Id.
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well beyond that just on those where you have some rather
vague ...
ASHCROFT: Well, this is a concern expressed by Senator
Kennedy and, obviously, we need to clarify this because there is
no - we don't want to have some thing which has an effect
which we don't intend.64
Nevertheless, in subsequent negotiations with Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-Vt.), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Department of Justice offered to change section 202's threshold standard
from "reason to believe" to "reasonable grounds to believe" that the
targeted individual would commit or aid acts of terrorism. 65 The Justice Department expected this "subtle modification . . . to satisfy
lawmakers' desire for a higher threshold of evidence," 66 even though
the alteration did not confirm Attorney General Ashcroft's promise
at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that the provision would
be circumscribed to reach only those non-citizens who were subject to
ongoing deportation proceedings while the same were pending.67
Senator Leahy, however, held the Bush Administration to the
promise extracted by Senators Kennedy and Specter from Attorney
General Ashcroft. 68 On October 11, 2001, the upper chamber passed
Senate Bill 1510, which authorized the Attorney General to detain a
non-citizen suspected of terrorist activity but also imposed the following restriction on the official's authority:
(5) COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. - The Attorney General shall place an alien detained under paragraph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall charge the alien
with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after the commencement of such detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is not satisfied, the Attorney General shall
release the alien.69
Senator Leahy emphasized that, under the legislation adopted by
the Senate, "if an alien is found not to be removable, he must be released from custody."70 Senate Bill 1510 also expressly provided for
64. Id. (statements of Sen. Specter and Attorney General Ashcroft).
65. Lancaster, supra note 52, at A6.
66. Id. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American Values on Trial,
supra note 51.
67. See supra text accompanying note 64. See generally Koh, supra note 55, at 34-36.
68. Lancaster, supra note 52, at A6. See also 147 CONG. REC. S10558 (daily ed. Oct.
11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy recounting his office's negotiations with the Administration on proposed sections 202 and 203).
69. S.1510, 107th Cong.§ 412 (2001), reprinted at 147 CONG. REC. S10621.
70. 147 CONG. REC. S10558 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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federal judicial review, through habeas corpus proceedings, of "any
action or decision relating to this section[,] including judicial review
of the merits of" the Attorney General's certification that the legal
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the non-citizen was a terrorist or otherwise presented a national security threat. 11 The full
Congress imposed the above-described, significant limitations on the
detainment authority granted to the Attorney General and inserted
those restrictions without substantive change in section 412 of the
USA PATRIOT ACT, which President Bush signed into law on October 26, 2001. 12
In summary, during the immediate aftermath of the September
11 attacks, the Bush Administration requested legislation that would
have authorized the Attorney General to certify for indefinite detention any non-citizen, legal or illegal, whom the official suspected of
being a terrorist or otherwise a national security threat, subject only
73
to "ministerial" judicial review. Senior members of both major political parties in each house of Congress encountered extreme political pressure to acquiesce in this request and risked political repercussions in implementing what lawmakers perceived as their duty under
the Constitution to keep the inexorable post-September 11 expansion
of presidential police powers within constitutional limits. The Bush
Administration, however, did not long honor this expression of legislative will. As we detail below, less than three weeks after the chief
executive signed the USA PATRIOT ACT into law, President Bush
issued his order on military tribunals, which accorded the Executive
Branch not only the authority that Congress had specifically rejected
but also additional powers that the administration had neglected even
to seek.

71. Id. ("subjecting Attorney General's certification [to] judicial review").
72. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 412(a), 115 Stat. 272, 351 (2001) [hereinafter§ 412 of the Patriot Act]. It also changed
the Administration proposal, which would have required all habeas corpus petitions to be
filed in the District of Columbia federal courts. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Section 412 permits original petitions to be filed in any U.S. district court otherwise having
jurisdiction, satisfying Administration concerns about conflicting authority in different
federal circuits with the less onerous stricture that all appeals be heard by the D.C. Circuit,
and provides that Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit rulings would supply the "rule of decision" in all cases.§ 412, 115 Stat. at 352. See generally Koh, supra note 55, at 34.
73. Supra note 60. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American Values on Trial, supra note 51.
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B. The Bush Order and Department of Defense Implementing
Regulations

Senators and representatives denied the request lodged by Attorney General Ashcroft, the nation's highest-ranking legal officer,
for authority to detain indefinitely any non-citizen whom the official
suspected of terrorism. 74 This explicit legislative rejection proved to
be a mere temporary setback for the Bush Administration, because
section 3 of the November 13, 2001 Executive Order granted the Secretary of Defense precisely the same power.
Section 3 authorizes and directs the Secretary of Defense to take
into custody and "detain[] at an appropriate location ... outside or
within the United States" all "individual[s] subject to" the Order.
Section 2 of the Order defines "individual subject to this order" to
mean "any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect
to whom [the President] determine[s] from time to time in writing
that there is reason to believe that such individual" is an international
terrorist dangerous to the United States or is a person who "has
knowingly harbored one or more" such people. 75 Thus, the Order
grants to the Defense Department all of the power that the Administration had previously but unsuccessfully sought from Congress.
Indeed, the authority claimed by the Bush Order is significantly
broader than even that power the Administration had requested from
legislators. The most aggressive position the Administration assumed
before Congress was that federal habeas corpus review of detentions
should be limited to the federal courts in the District of Columbia.76
The Bush directive, however, would purportedly dispense altogether
with any judicial review sought by or on behalf of "any individual

74. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72 (discussing legislative history of§ 412 of
the USA PATRIOT ACT).
75. Bush Order, supra note 3, at § 2. This section also limits the Order's scope to persons whom the President deems "it is in the interest of the United States [] be subject to
this order." Id. Though this limitation grants the President discretion not to subject an
otherwise implicated individual to the Order's terms, because that discretion is unbridled
it does not restrain executive branch power to employ the Order's provisions against anyone deemed by the President to be an international terrorist or one who aids or abets such
conduct.
76. See supra note 56. See also supra note 72 (showing Congress rejected idea and
treated fears about conflicting authority of Administration with less onerous habeas corpus venue provision); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity
of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 252-54 (2002) (assessing the constitutional authority for the Bush Order); Molly McDonough, Tribunals vs. Trials, 88 A.B.A.
J., Jan. 2002, at 20.
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77

subject to [the] order. "
The plain meaning of section 7(b) has received subsequent confirmation in the United States Department of Defense Military Order
Number One ("DOD Order"), promulgated on March 21, 2002,
which establishes the procedures for, and the membership of, military
commissions authorized by the Bush Order and otherwise implements this directive. 78 The DOD Order strictly forbids federal judicial
review of any aspects of any proceeding undertaken pursuant to the
Bush Order. The DOD Order provides, in pertinent part, for review
of the record compiled in the trial before a military commission by a
panel comprised of three military officers "at least one of which
[sic] ... shall have experience as a judge." 79 The DOD Order instructs
the tribunal so constituted to "disregard any variance from procedures specified in this Order or elsewhere that would not materially
have affected the outcome of the trial before the Commission."80
Moreover, the review panel cannot "return the case ... for further
proceedings," unless "a majority of the (members] has formed a definite and firm conviction that a material error of law has occurred."81
Otherwise, the panel forwards the matter to the Secretary of Defense,
who may return the case for additional proceedings, forward the matter to the president with a recommendation regarding disposition, or
make the final determination respecting the charge as well as the sentence, if authorized by the chief executive to do so. 82 Should lingering
doubt remain that the Bush and DOD Orders preclude all further review - including presumably any intervention by a federal court that is
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction - section 6(H)(2) of the DOD
Order expressly provides,
[A] Commission finding as to a charge and any sentence of a
77. Bush Order, supra note 3, § 7(b). See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note
15.
78. DOD Order, supra note 3. See also Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH, J, INT'L L. 677 (2002); John
Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al; Deborah
L. Rhode, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at A27.
79. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(4). See also Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Readies
Plans for Terror Tribunals, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al; Are Tribunal Rules Fair?,
wASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2002, at Al8.
80. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(4); see generally Margaret Graham Tebo, ABA
Decries Detainee Handling, 88 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2002, at 21; John Mintz, Tribunal Rules Aim
to Shield Witnesses, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, at Al.
81. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(4); see generally Mintz, supra note 78; Serrano,
supra note 79.
82. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(5); see generally Mintz, supra note 80.
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Commission becomes final when the President or, if designated
by the President, the Secretary of Defense makes a final decision thereon . . . . Any sentence made final by action of the
President or the Secretary of Defense shall be carried out
promptly. 83
Furthermore, the intent of the Bush Administration to preclude
relief by federal habeas corpus does not cover only those ultimately
tried and convicted by military commissions. In official statements
made contemporaneously with the publication of the DOD Order,
Defense Department officers observed that "[t]he vast majority of
captives ... will be released if they are found innocent, sent to their
home countries for trial or detained indefinitely without charges if the
United States considers them too dangerous to release but lacks enough
evidence to prosecute them." 84 These comments, together with section
6(H) of the DOD Order and section 7(b) of the Bush Order, suggest
the Bush Administration's intent to maintain custody of suspected
terrorists substantially beyond the terms of that authority which lawmakers granted in the USA PATRIOT ACT. 85

83. DOD Order, supra note 3, § 6(H)(2). See also Mintz, supra note 78; Serrano, supra note 79.
84. See Mintz, supra note 80 (emphasis added). See also Rhode, supra note 78; Serrano, supra note 79.
85. Given the Order's express and implied prohibitions on federal court review, we
find inadequate White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales' claim that "judicial review in
civilian court," is preserved under the Bush Order: "anyone arrested, detained or tried in
the United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the
commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Alberto
R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27. This otherwise promising concession does not offset the many indications that certification under
Bush's Order precludes federal court review of detention, imprisonment, or imposition of
other punishment, including death, authorized by the Order.
First, Gonzales sharply restricted his promise of "judicial review in [the] civilian courts" to
those "arrested, detained or tried in the United States" (query if Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
is "in the U.S."). Id. Even then, a federal habeas corpus proceeding would only treat
challenges to the "lawfulness of [a military] commission's jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis
added). Depending on the Administration view of the legal term "jurisdiction," it may
well argue a federal habeas court would be limited to the ministerial task of confirming the
President had in fact found in writing a detainee "subject to" his Order. Bush Order, supra note 3, § 2; cf House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 59 (statement of Rep.
Nadler) (voicing concern that judicial review of detentions under Administration's proposed anti-terrorism bill would be "only ministerial"). Second, Gonzales justified his informal view by citation to the Supreme Court case of Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942),
which reviewed challenges to President Roosevelt's World War II order authorizing trial
of alleged Nazi saboteurs before military tribunals, not by the Bush Order's text which
seems to preclude any judicial review. Gonzales, supra. But the Court reached the merits
in Quirin only after the Justice Department elected "not to contest the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction." Cutler, supra note 19. However, the Bush Administration might well con-
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C. Congressional Reactions

Two days after the President issued the executive order authorizing indefinite detainment and trial by military tribunals, Senator
Specter, a senior Republican, and longtime, active member of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, voiced concerns on the Senate floor that
the Chief Executive's directive exceeded his constitutional power.86
Senator Specter insisted that "under the Constitution it is the Congress that has the authority to establish the parameters and the proceedings under [military] courts." 87 Accordingly, he called for the
Senate Judiciary Committee to hold hearings that would inquire into
the constitutional and prudential issues raised by the Bush Order. 88 A
rare colloquy next ensued between Senator Specter and Senate Judiciary Chair Leahy, who publicly thanked the senator from Pennsylvania on the chamber floor for raising questions related to the Bush Order and promised that he would convene a committee hearing on the
matter during the period which immediately followed the thenimpending Thanksgiving recess. 89
In fact, over a two-week time frame spanning late November and
early December 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted
three days of hearings on the Bush Order and received testimony
from eighteen witnesses.9() A broad spectrum of public officials and
constitutional scholars, who hold quite diverse political perspectives,

test jurisdiction, relying on the Bush and DOD Orders' plain terms and, thus, force the
courts to address the constitutional issues the Court avoided in 1942. See supra note 19.
Finally, even if contrary to these reservations, Gonzales had clearly construed the Bush
Order as affirmatively protecting adequate judicial review through habeas corpus proceedings, this view might not be the final word. Without questioning his integrity or good
faith or those of other Bush staff, White House Counsel's newspaper opinion piece does
not preclude the Administration from asserting in later litigation contrary views on the
meaning of the Bush and DOD Orders, especially were they are closer to the Orders'
texts. We urge President Bush to acquiesce in searching federal court review of actions
under his Orders but Gonzales's article does not irrevocably commit the President to this
position. See infra text accompanying note 292-93.
86. See 147 CONG. REC. S11888-890 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Specter).
87. Id. at S11888. See generally Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; American
Values on Trial, supra note 51.
88. 147 CONG. REC. at S11888; see also McDonough, supra note 76; Neil A. Lewis,
U.S. Seeking Basis to Charge War Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, at Al; Winging it
at Guantanamo, supra note 15.
89. 147 CONG. REC. at S11888-89 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
90. 147 CONG. REC. S13275-77 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(reviewing the hearings related to the Bush Order conducted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee).
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testified during those sessions. Some witnesses, such as representatives of the current administration and individuals who served in several prior ones, argued that the President's power as "Commander-inChief"91 of the United States armed forces encompassed the authority
to promulgate the Executive Order,92 although no one who offered
testimony addressed the precise issue which we examine: presidential
power unilaterally to preclude the exercise of federal court jurisdiction created by pre-existing statute. However, additional witnesses,
namely certain of the nation's most distinguished authorities on the
Constitution, expressed grave reservations regarding the Order's validity, because the directive invaded the province of Congress93 or potentially infringed individual rights that the Bill of Rights affirma94
tively guarantees.
This testimony, and subsequent developments, including the
Bush Administration's rejection of legislative "requests ... to review
and be consulted about the draft [DOD] regulations," 95 which implement the Bush Order, as well as the American Bar Association's
publication of recommendations for congressional action responsive
to the directive, prompted action by Senator Leahy. 96 Exactly three
months after the President issued the Order, Chair Leahy introduced
a bill that "would provide the executive branch with the specific
authorization it now lacks to use extraordinary tribunals to try members of the al Qaeda terrorist network and those who cooperated with
them." 97 Senator Leahy, who relied in part on testimony presented at
the Judiciary Committee hearings held during late 2001, declared his
view that President Bush lacked the constitutional power to create

91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See also infra notes 134-36, 191, 287 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (statement
of Attorney General Ashcroft) ("The president has ordered - and it is a military order, to
the [DOD - it's part] of his responsibility as commander in chief of a nation in conflict
[that the DOD] develop a framework that would provide full and fair proceedings.").
93. See 147 CONG. REC. S13277 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(summarizing testimony of a number of legal experts who found that the Bush Order invaded the powers of Congress).
94. See, e.g., DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Nov. 28, 2001), at
www.senate.gov/judiciary (testimony of Neal Katyal stating how the Bush Order would
violate protections in the Bill of Rights).
95. 148 CONG. REC. S742 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
96. See id.; ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14.
97. 148 CONG. REC. S741 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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special military tribunals unilaterally:
The Attorney General testified at our hearing on December 6
that the President does not need the sanction of Congress to
convene military commission[s], but I disagree. Military tribuonly if
nals may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but
98
they are backed by specific congressional authorization.

Senator Leahy's proposed legislation would circumscribe military
detainment and military trials much more narrowly, and impose considerably greater procedural safeguards, than did the Bush Order.
First, the bill exempts from military trial or detainment "individuals
arrested while in the United States, since our civilian court system is
well-equipped to handle such cases."99 Indeed, Leahy's recommended
statute would expressly shelter from detainment and military trial not
only American citizens but also all "alien[s] lawfully admitted for
permanent residence."' 00 Moreover, the bill would authorize military
detainment and trial of only those persons "apprehended in Afghanistan, fleeing from Afghanistan, or in or fleeing from any other place
outside the United States where there is armed conflict involving the
Armed Forces of the United States." 101
In addition to imposing these limitations on the scope of executive branch authority to detain persons and try them in military commissions, Senator Leahy's proposal would provide individuals who
are subject to these extraordinary powers significant procedural protections which neither the Bush Order nor the subsequent DOD Or102
der implementing the directive affords. Most relevant to the issues
that we consider are the Leahy bill's provisions which subject detentions under its authority to the supervision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 103 The suggested
measure would similarly provide for appellate review of military tribunals' judgments in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces - an all-civilian court comprised of judges whom the
98. Id. (emphasis added). See also Lewis, supra note 88; Winging it at Guantanamo,
supra note 15.
99. 148 CONG. REC. at S742. See also Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002,
S.1941, 107th Cong.§ 3 (2002). On March 20, 2002, House members introduced an identical bill. See H.R. 4035, 107th Cong. (2002).
100. 148 CONG. REC. S744 (reprinting section-by-section analysis of S.1941).
101. S. 1941, § 3(a)(3). See generally U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, supra note
79; American Values on Trial, supra note 51.
102. See S.1941, §§ 4 & 5. See also Lewis, supra note 88; Rhode, supra note 78.
103. See S.1941, § 5(d). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994); CHRISTOPHER BANKS,
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT (1999); JEFFREY MORRIS, CALMLY TO
POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (2001).
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president appoints, with Senate advice and consent, to fifteen-year
terms - as well as further review in the United States Supreme Court
through writ of certiorari. 104 The bill introduced by Senator Leahy
was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee which has thus
far taken no further action on the measure. 105
In sum, President George W. Bush premised on two principal
sources the November 13, 2001 Executive Order, which would mandate that military commissions try certain individuals whom the government prosecutes for violating the laws of war and additional applicable laws and which would concomitantly deprive these defendants
of federal court access and the federal judiciary of jurisdiction. Bush
relied on the power vested in him as the president and as the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces by the Constitution and federal statutes, particularly the congressional joint resolution that authorized deployment of military force.
Major leaders from both political parties in each chamber, nonetheless, voiced serious concerns about whether the Bush Order was
constitutional, which concomitantly prompted a series of oversight
hearings and ultimately led to the introduction of proposed legislation. The Senate bill would not only substantially circumscribe the
power asserted by President Bush but also explicitly preserve a role
for federal courts in reviewing the Administration's actions. These
expressions of congressional disapproval, especially combined with
lawmakers' refusal to grant prior Administration requests for even a
portion of the expansive authority claimed in the Bush Order, demonstrate that the directive's purported abrogation of federal court jurisdiction clearly conflicts with legislative will.
In analyzing the Bush Order's attempted abolition of judicial jurisdiction, it is important to understand that the specific terminology
used by the Founders when they crafted the Constitution, relevant
history of the basic document, and controlling Supreme Court case
law demonstrate the Constitution endows Congress with virtually
complete power to establish the federal courts and prescribe their jurisdiction. President Truman's assertion of constitutional authority
for seizing the steel mills during 1952 and the High Court determination in Youngstown that the chief executive lacked the requisite

104. S.1941, § 4(e)(2) & (3). See generally 10 U.S.C §§ 867, 942 (1994); Pub. L. No.
103-337, 108 Stat. 2663 (1994); Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177 (1995); TRIBE, supra note 7, at
298-99.
105. 148 CONG. REC. S741 (noting bill's referral to Senate Committee on Armed
Services).
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power comprise the most directly applicable precedent. Thus, we
comprehensively scrutinize Youngstown below.

III. A "Police Action" in Korea, the Steel Seizure Order, and
the Youngstown Opinion
In this section of the article, we explore numerous relevant developments which transpired fifty years ago. The segment initially
examines requests that several presidential administrations lodged for
legislative authorization to employ governmental seizure as a mechanism which would treat conflicts between labor and management,
while the part discusses how senators and representatives addressed
overtures from various chief executives. We then describe President
Truman's steel seizure initiative, emphasizing the power that his Executive Order claimed for this action. The portion next analyzes the
Supreme Court decision in Youngstown, which held the Truman Order unconstitutional. The section concludes with a brief assessment
of the meaning attributed to the pathbreaking opinion over the subsequent half century.
A. Administration Requests for Legislative Authorization and
Congressional Responses

Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority in the Youngstown
case, found "there is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here [and no legislation]
from which such a power can fairly be implied." 106 Moreover, when
the members of Congress were evaluating possible adoption of the
Labor Management Relations, or Taft-Hartley, Act of 1947, lawmakers explicitly rejected a proposed amendment in the measure that
would have authorized the chief executive to use seizure as a device
which would resolve labor disputes in national emergencies. 107
Justice Felix Frankfurter authored a concurring opinion that
elaborated on the somewhat laconic exposition in the majority decision which Justice Black penned. 108 Frankfurter traced in consum-

106. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 {1952). See also infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. See generally MARCUS, supra note 2, at 1-57; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 2-6.
107. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586. See also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying
text. See generally MARCUS, supra note 2, at 162-64: The Labor Management Relations
and Taft-Hartley Acts are identical.
108. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 {Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 203.
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mate detail back to Woodrow Wilson's presidency the sixteen prior
circumstances when Congress had clearly provided for the "seizure of
production, transportation, communications, or storage facilities" by
109
The jurist correa significant number of earlier administrations.
spondingly determined that senators and representatives deemed this
tool's invocation so radical as to circumscribe sharply its executive
11
branch deployment. ° Frankfurter then thoroughly documented legislative consideration of the Labor Management Relations Act in
1947, which the Justice characterized as the most recent, applicable
congressional activity, while the jurist ascertained that lawmakers had
in effect "said to the President: '[y]ou may not seize. Please report to
us and ask for seizure power if you think it is needed in a specific
situation. "' 111
B. President Truman's Steel Seizure Order

In mid-1950, the United States entered the conflict between
North and South Korea, although Congress never issued a formal
declaration of war. 112 During late 1951, the United Steelworkers of
America and the principal domestic steel manufacturers became embroiled in a contentious dispute over applicable terms and conditions
of workers' employment. When protracted negotiations between labor and management, the conclusion of which the federal government
had attempted to facilitate, yielded no satisfactory resolution, the
steelworkers' union announced that it would sponsor a nationwide
strike which was scheduled to commence on April 9, 1952. Because
steel was an indispensable constituent for most war material, the
Truman Administration feared that a work stoppage would seriously
disrupt United States military participation in the Korean conflict.
President Truman, therefore, promulgated an April 8 Executive Order which instructed the Secretary of Commerce, John Sawyer, to
seize American steel mills and operate the entities on the country's
behalf. 113 The Chief Executive premised that order on the authority
109. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597-98. See also infra notes 121-23, 146 and accompanying text.
110. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 598. See also infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
111. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603. See also infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
112. We rely substantially in this subpart on Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
Youngstown; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 105-07
(1990); MARCUS, supra note 2; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 2-29; WESTIN, supra note 2;
see also U.S. CONST. art.l, § 8, cl. 11.
113. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at
58-82; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 29-36; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7-16. See generally
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vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
and as president and commander-in-chief of American armed forces.
Commerce Secretary Sawyer concomitantly issued several orders
which requested that the presidents of the seized steel corporations
114
serve as those companies' operating managers for the nation. The
following day, Truman transmitted to Congress a report on his administration's activities and twelve days thereafter he delivered senators and representatives another message; both of these missives effectively encouraged lawmakers to pass legislation, even intimating
that members of Congress might reject the course of action which the
President had selected. 115 However, lawmakers did not respond to the
116
Chief Executive's importuning.
C. The Youngstown Opinion

1. Overview of the Litigation

The country's steel producers complied under protest with the
orders promulgated by President Truman and Commerce Secretary
Sawyer and immediately instituted litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The manufacturers alleged
that neither the United States Constitution nor federal legislation
empowered the Truman Administration to seize American steel
companies, and the corporations sought a declaration invalidating the
presidential and secretarial directives. 117 United States District Judge
Alexander Holtzhoff first denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order on April 9. 118 Nevertheless, United States Dis-

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-83.
114. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. See generally CHARLES SAWYER, CONCERNS OF A
CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRAT {1968); Robert F. Banks, Steel, Sawyer, and the Executive
Power, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 467 (1953).
115. See Message from President Harry S. Truman to Congress, 98 CONG. REC. H3962
(daily ed. Apr. 9, 1952); Message from President Harry S. Truman to Congress, 98 CONG.
REC. H4192 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1952). See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 94; Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 583. See generally infra note 225.
116. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 95-101. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87,
98-99 (Spr. 1976).
117. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. See generally MARCUS, supra note 2, at 102-03;
MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 38; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 155; WESTIN, supra note
2, at 26-36.
118. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978, 981 {D.D.C. 1952).
See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 103-08; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 155-58; WESTIN,
supra note 2, at 34-43.
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trict Judge David A. Pine ultimately granted a preliminary injunction
which restrained the Commerce Secretary from continuing to seize
and possess the steel mills on April 29. 119 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stayed Judge Pine's order the same day. 120 The Supreme Court deemed best the expeditious
resolution of the case, while the Justices granted certiorari on May 3
before the appellate court issued a final judgment, set the matter for
argument nine days thereafter, and issued the High Court's opinion
on June 2. 121
Justice Black, writing for the majority, affirmed the district
court's decision. 122 Justice Frankfurter observed that he joined the
Black opinion because Frankfurter agreed with the separation of
powers analysis undertaken by his colleague; however, Frankfurter
trenchantly admonished that the application of the principle appeared
substantially more complex and flexible than may have seemed at
first glance from the determination which Black authored. 123 Frankfurter correspondingly remarked that, although diverse perceptions
related to separation of powers might have merely reflected, "differences in emphasis and nuance, they [could] hardly be" captured by a
single opinion and, therefore, necessitated the "individual expression
of views in reaching a common result. " 124 All four Supreme Court
Justices - Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, William 0. Douglas, and
Harold Burton - who joined with Black penned separate decisions,
while Justice Tom Clark concurred in the judgment but not in Black's
opinion. 125 Chief Justice Fred Vinson wrote a dissent that Justice
119. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 577 (D.D.C. 1952). See
also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 108-129; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 36-41; REHNQUIST,
supra note 2, at 158-168; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 51-72. See generally Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 584.
120. See Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See generally Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584; MARCUS, supra note 2, at 130-148; MCCONNELL, supra
note 2, at 42-43; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 167-68; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 73-87.
121. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See also MARCUS, supra note 2, at 147-49;
McCONNELL, supra note 2, at 44; REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 167-68; WESTIN, supra
note 2, at 88-95.
122. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. See generally infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
123. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also infra notes
128-145 and accompanying text. See generally infra notes 146-62, 174-88 and accompanying text.
124. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. See also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
125. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at
660 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment). See also id. at 582 (affording Justice Black's
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Stanley Reed and Justice Sherman Minton joined.126 Shortly after the
High Court had issued its determination, the United Steelworkers of
America conducted a strike lasting for 53 days, which had practically
no discernable effect on United States military involvement in the
Korean conflict, because a steel shortage failed to materialize while
the labor union and the manufacturers ultimately settled their differences.121
2. The Majority Opinion in Youngstown
Justice Black declared that presidential authority, if any relevant
power existed, to issue the order must be prescribed in a federal statute or in the United States Constitution. 128 The jurist could discover
neither legislation expressly authorizing the chief executive to seize
private property nor congressional enactments from which such a
prerogative might fairly be implied. 129 Black specifically observed that
no statute in explicit words permitted reliance on the seizure procedure as a means for addressing disputes over employment conditions
between labor and management, while senators and representatives
had clearly refused to approve the particular approach for resolving
these controversies. 130 When lawmakers considered passage of the
Labor Management Relations Act in 1947, the legislative branch rejected a recommended amendment in the statute which would have
empowered the federal government to seize various industrial processes during national emergencies. 131 "Consequently, the plan Congress adopted in the Act did not provide for seizure under any circumstances. " 132
If President Truman possessed the requisite authority to promulgate the order seizing the country's steel mills, the Constitution must
give the officer this power. The United States government, when de-

opinion); infra notes 146-213 and accompanying text
126. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667 (Vinson, C. J., dissenting).
127. See MARCUS, supra note 2, at 249-260; MCCONNELL, supra note 2, at 47-53;
WESTIN, supra note 2, at 170-71. See also REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 189-92.
128. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. See also infra note 210 and accompanying text. See
generally JOHN FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS (1949);
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK (1994).
129. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. See also supra note 106 and accompanying text.
130. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-86. See also supra note 106, infra notes 154-55 and
accompanying text.
131. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted). See also supra notes 106, 110 and
accompanying text; infra note 156 and accompanying text.
132. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586. See also infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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fending the Truman Administration's issuance of the Executive Order, argued that the Supreme Court should infer presidential authority from the aggregate of those powers which the chief executive
claimed under the essential document and did not pursue the contention that the president had depended upon an express grant of constitutional authority. 133
Black then reviewed the various sources from which the power
Truman asserted was said to emanate. The Justice first declared that
the initiative could not be sustained by denominating it an exercise of
the president's military authority as commander-in-chief of American
armed forces. 134 Black rejected governmental reliance on numerous
cases, which accorded military leaders with responsibility for daily
combat in a war theater broad powers to seize private property and
prevent labor disputes from disrupting industrial production. 135 He
characterized Truman's seizure effort as a "job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities." 136
The jurist next determined that the Executive Order which the
administration had adopted would receive no support from the several constitutional provisions that bestowed executive power on the
president. The document's framework, which grants the official
authority for taking care that the "laws are faithfully executed refutes" the notion of the president as lawmaker, while this structure
limits the chief executive's functions in the legislative process to recommending statutory proposals which the officer considers advisable
and vetoing measures the official deems inappropriate. 137 Moreover,
Black found the Constitution clear and unequivocal that Congress
"shall make the laws which the President is to execute," and the Justice quoted extensively from the provision in Article I that "all legislative Powers be vested in a Congress [authorized to] make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the

133. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 158-60, 195-98 and accompanying text.
134. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 141, 191-92 and accompanying
text.
135. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. He found theater of war an expanding concept but
could not hold constitutional the president's executive order. Id. See also infra note 191
and accompanying text.
136. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 141, 192 and accompanying
text.
137. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; NOWAK &
ROTUNDA; supra note 18, at 256; infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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enumerated powers and all others afforded the federal government. 138
The jurist described the Truman Administration directive as an enactment and carefully detailed how the order's preamble, like that in
numerous statutes, propounded reasons why the president believed
certain policies warranted adoption, while the directive proffered
those "policies as rules of conduct to be followed" and instructed an
executive branch officer to "promulgate additional rules and regulations consistent with the policy" proclaimed and necessary to its implementation.139 Black also stated that Congress certainly could have
approved the policies enunciated in the Truman Administration order
through legislative authority to "take private property for public use"
as well as to pass statutes, which govern employee-employer relationships, which prescribe rules to resolve labor-management disputes,
and which fix working conditions and wages in particular segments of
the nation's economy. 140 The jurist emphatically admonished that the
"Constitution (did] not subject this law making power of Congress to
presidential or military supervision or control." 141
Black vociferously rejected appeals by the Truman Administration to previous practice of chief executives who, absent some
authority which senators and representatives had granted, purportedly exercised presidential power and seized private business enterprises when settling employment controversies between labor and
management. 142 Regardless of whether the government had accurately portrayed the relevant history, the Justice observed that Congress could not cede its "exclusive constitutional authority to make
laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers," which the United
States Constitution vested in the federal government. 143 Moreover,
the jurist remarked that the Founders of the country entrusted Congress alone with legislative authority in both good and bad times, 144
while recounting the historical developments, the hopes for freedom
and the fears of power which underlay the Framers' choices would
only confirm the proposition that this seizure action must be invali-

138. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88. See also U.S. CONST. art. I,§§ 1, 8, cl.18.
139. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. He facetiously commented that the Truman Administration Executive Order "directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by the President." Id.
140. Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8; infra note 193 and accompanying text.
141. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. See also infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
142. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. See also infra note 195 and accompanying text.
143. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89. See also U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 8, cl. 18.
144. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. See also infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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145

dated.
In short, Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court majority,
could discover no express or implicit statutory authority which might
substantiate the Truman Administration's Executive Order seizing
the steel companies. The jurist concomitantly ascertained that the
United States Constitution did not accord the president explicit
power to seize the corporations, while neither the official's authority
as commander-in-chief of American armed forces nor the officer's
executive power furnished implied support for the presidential initiative. Black also described seizure as lawmaking, which the Constitution bestows exclusively on Congress.
3. The Concurring Opinions in Youngstown

Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas and Burton all joined the
opinion that Justice Black authored and, therefore, comprised a majority of the High Court, while Justice Clark concurred only in the
judgment and wrote a separate decision. All four members who
joined the opinion penned by Black authored their own concurrences.
These Justices may have concurred for reasons similar to those which
Justice Frankfurter so clearly espoused and which we examined
above. 146
a. Justice Frankfurter's Opinion
Justice Frankfurter prefaced his analysis with a disquisition on
United States history, the tripartite branches of the federal government, and the judiciary's appropriate role and obligation when it adjudicates disputes about the meaning of the American Constitution. 147
Frankfurter characterized a constitutional democracy as an excep145. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. See also TRIBE, supra note 7, at 671-73 (criticizing
Black's approach to Congress' silence); Joseph Grundfest & A. C. Pritchard, Statutes With
Multiple Personality Disorders, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002); infra text accompanying
notes 203-04, 210. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994) (assessing silence); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (1997).
146. The method in which Justice Black applied separation of powers led him to join
the majority opinion, but he found the principle more complex and flexible than it seemed
and stated that varying views might have suggested different emphasis and nuance which
one decision could not capture, thus requiring individual articulation to reach a common
result. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also supra notes
122-23 and accompanying text.
147. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593. See also Neal K. Katya!, Judges as Advicegivers, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); Abner Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katya/, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998); supra notes 107-10, 146
and accompanying text; sources cited infra note 151.
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tionally difficult social arrangement to administer with success in part
because the form "implies the reign of reason on the most extensive
scale." 148 The jurist remarked that the Founders clearly recognized
the need for limiting the power which the governors exercise over the
individuals whom they govern; premised the central government's
structure on checks and balances that would attain this objective; and
considered the separation of powers principle to be a "felt necessity. "149 Frankfurter claimed the Framers labored under no illusions
about the hazards which concentrated authority presented, and the
Justice perspicaciously warned that the "accretion of dangerous
power does not come in a day [but] slowly from the generative force
of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority. "150
The jurist adamantly disavowed the notion that the judiciary
could serve as an overseer for the United States government, while he
observed that federal courts must rigorously abide by a circumscribed
view of the judicial function in addressing constitutional disputes and
even refrain from deciding those complicated, sensitive controversies
whenever this approach proves intellectually defensible. 151 After
Frankfurter evinced profound reluctance about, but discerned no
means to avoid, scrutiny of the powers and responsibilities which the
other governmental branches exercise, the jurist proffered as the
touchstone for resolving constitutional adjudication the famous pronouncement from Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland that "it is a constitution we are expounding." 152 Frankfurter
considered advice proffered by the revered jurist especially apropos
when the Supreme Court is applying the separation of powers doctrine which underlies the document, and Frankfurter invoked the admonition from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that the principal ordinances in the Constitution "do not establish and divide fields of
148. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593. See also infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
149. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593. See also infra notes 197-98, 202-04 and accompanying text.
150. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594. See also infra notes 167, 200-04 and accompanying
text.
151. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594-95. See also LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE
(2001); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 311-464; Rachel Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 237 (2002); infra note 231.
152. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 596 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original)). See generally JEANE. SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL
(1996); Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217
(1955); infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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black and white." 153
Justice Frankfurter carefully disclaimed any need for examining,
much less reaching definitive conclusions about, the chief executive's
authority in the absence of legislation which he found to implicate
presidential power for seizing the steel mills. 154 The Justice comprehensively surveyed relevant actions undertaken by members of Congress and determined that lawmakers had authorized executive
branch seizure on sixteen occasions over the preceding three and a
half decades but had qualified every particular grant with limitations
and safeguards. 155 The jurist assessed what he described as the most
recent, applicable legislative consideration of the issue; ascertained
that senators and representatives forcefully and clearly withheld
authority in 1947 by commanding the president to request explicit seizure power, should the officer need it; and disavowed imposition of
any requirement for negating the "authority in formal legislation,"
because Congress expressed the "will to withhold this power as
though it had said so" specifically. 156 Frankfurter analyzed subsequent
legislative activity, as well as important later and contemporaneous
developments, most notably, the Korean conflict. However, he concluded that no authority had thereafter withdrawn the restriction instituted or changed the congressional perspective enunciated in the
1947 Labor Management Relations Act. 157
The Justice found inappropriate the notion of narrowly confining
constitutional law to the precise terms which the Founders had incorporated in the fundamental document while disregarding the "gloss
which life has written upon them." 158 For example, Frankfurter ex153. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Springer v.
Government of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 {1928) {Holmes, J., dissenting)); infra
note 237 and accompanying text.
154. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597 {Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Felix Frankfurter, Reading of Statutes-Some Reflections, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1946); supra notes
105-10, 129-30 and accompanying text.
155. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597-98. See also supra notes 105-06, 108, 129-31 and accompanying text.
156. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602. Justice Frankfurter trenchantly observed that "it
would be not merely infelicitous draftsmanship but almost offensive gaucherie to write
such a restriction upon the President's power in terms into a statute rather than to have it
authoritatively expounded as it was, by controlling legislative history." Id., 343 U.S. at
603. See also supra notes 106, 110, 132-33 and accompanying text.
157. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603-10. Frankfurter observed that "to find authority so
explicitly withheld is not merely to disregard in a particular instance the clear will of Congress. It is to disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division of
authority between President and Congress." Id. at 609.
158. Id. at 610. See also infra note 189 and accompanying text.
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pressed appreciation that a "systematic, executive practice, long pursued" with Congress's knowledge and which lawmakers had left unquestioned over a protracted time might warrant treatment as a
"gloss on 'executive power' vested in the President" by Article II of
the Constitution. 159 Nevertheless, the jurist's thoroughgoing review of
earlier circumstances when the federal government had seized private
commercial instrumentalities revealed that senators and representatives had not historically acquiesced to the exercise of executive
authority. 160
Justice Frankfurter briefly reexamined the limitations that the
Framers imposed upon the efficiency of a government with distributed power, which litigants can challenge in federal court. 161 The jurist contended that the Founders deemed the price acceptable in light
of the valuable safeguards which the restrictions afforded and quoted
Justice Louis Brandeis for this proposition. 162 Frankfurter acknowledged how unpleasant he considered finding that the Truman Administration had exceeded its authority, especially when the President
was animated by the crucial need to protect the country and to avert
163
danger in a national crisis. However, the jurist trusted the patriotism and wisdom of the executive and legislative branches would lead
both institutions to reconcile their differences on issues which were
overshadowed by momentous global events. 164
In short, Justice Frankfurter clearly recognized the critical necessity for exercising judicial restraint, while he emphatically voiced
grave doubts, premised on concerns related to .the Supreme Court's
authority and legitimacy, about intervening in a dispute between the
president and the members of Congress over separation of powers. 165
159. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11. See also infra note 245 and accompanying text.
160. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 611-13. See also infra note 195 and accompanying text.
161. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 613. See also infra note 209 and accompanying text.
162. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 613-14. The Framers adopted separation of powers, "not
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was,
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."
Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
163. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614. See also infra note 212 and accompanying text.
164. He invoked a similar "moment of utmost anxiety" when President George
Washington sought the Court's advice which it could not give, while Frankfurter was
heartened by the idea that Truman and Congress would continue to safeguard this heritage derived directly from Washington. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614.
165. We rely here on FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT
(1930); PHILIP KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971);

410

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29:3

Despite the substantial reluctance evidenced, the jurist felt compelled
by his constitutional duty to declare that Truman lacked seizure
authority.
b. Justice Jackson's Opinion
Justice Robert Jackson's concurrence, which Professor Sanford
Levinson has characterized as the single most important opinion in
the High Court's history, is principally renowned for the three-part
analysis which the jurist devised for treating disagreements over political branch assertions of power. 166 However, the opinion is also important because it exemplifies Jackson's consummate ability to differentiate with clarity his role and perspective when serving as a
Supreme Court Justice from his responsibilities and views as an adviser in several capacities, namely Solicitor General and Attorney
General, for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Democratic Administration. For instance, Jackson warned that the question of a
power's validity and the substantive policy which it is invoked to foster could be easily confused; that thorough, undefined presidential
authority has pragmatic benefits and severe risks for the United
States; and that undue emphasis on transient results may have enduring ramifications for the balanced power structure that had benefited the country so substantially for a century and a half. 167 Moreover, the concurrence might be the most lucid, straightforward
exposition on the remarkable dearth of very clear and useful legal
authority which applies to concrete issues that involve executive
power as the questions manifest themselves in practice. 168 The Framers' intent must be divined from enigmatic sources, which 150 years of
scholarly investigation and partisan debate had failed to illuminate, 169

JOSEPH LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1975); MELVIN UROFSKY,
FELIX FRANKFURTER (1991); Frankfurter, supra note 154.
166. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 63-39 (Jackson, J., concurring); Sanford Levinson, The
Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE
LAW 187, 202-04 (Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996). See also Katyal & Tribe,
supra note 4, at 1285 (characterizing Jackson's analytical construct as "three nowcanonical categories that guide modern analysis of separation of powers"); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 199 (1981) (expressing preference for Jackson's opinion over Black's).
167. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 2-20.
168. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-39. See also infra note 233.
169. The investigation and debate supply "more or less apt quotations from respected
sources on" both sides of questions which "largely cancel each other." Youngstown, 343
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while the Court's determinations are rather indecisive precisely because they address in the narrowest possible fashion the most profound matters. 110
Jackson also declared that the pragmatic art of constitutional
governance could not conform with judicial attempts to define the
authority exercised by the three governmental branches, which derive
from isolated clauses in the basic document or even specific Articles
111
ripped from context. The jurist recognized that the "Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty," although the Founders
also envisioned that actual experience would integrate dispersed
authority into a workable government, each coordinate branch of
which would be separate but interdependent and autonomous yet reciprocal.112 He observed that presidential powers were "not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those
of Congress." 173
Jackson introduced his three-pronged framework for assessment
of federal governmental authority by describing the construct as a
rather over-simplified categorization of practical instances in which
the chief executive might doubt, or other observers could question,
the president's power and by crudely differentiating the legal consequences that this factor of relativity produced. 174 The three classifications correspondingly delineate situations in which the chief executive's authority is greatest, least substantial and somewhere between
those polar opposites.
The Justice maintained that the president exercises the maximum
power when proceeding with explicit or implied congressional approval, because the authority encompasses all of the power which the
chief executive possesses and all of the authority which senators and
representatives delegate to the officer. 115 In this context, the president
personifies the federal sovereignty, so that invalidation of a particular
action which the official undertakes would mean that the "Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power. " 176
U.S. at 635 (citation omitted).
170. Id. See also supra note 151 and accompanying text; infra note 248 and accompanying text.
171. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. See also supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
172. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
173. Id. See generally Black, supra note 116, at 98-99.
174. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also infra text accompanying note 233.
175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
176. Id. at 637. A presidential seizure executed under statute would receive the
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Jackson characterized the second category as an intermediate
area in which the chief executive proceeds without an express legislative grant or denial. 177 The president can depend on the officer's own
authority alone; however, the Justice described a "twilight zone"
where the chief executive and Congress may possess concurrent
power or the distribution of authority remains unclear. 178 In these circumstances, therefore, legislative "inertia, indifference or acquiescence," as pragmatic matters, could occasionally permit, and even invite, independent presidential initiatives. 179 For the second grouping,
he admonished that actual tests of power will probably reflect the
"imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, [not] abstract legal theories. " 180
The last classification includes presidential endeavors which conflict with explicit or implied congressional will. Jackson characterized
the chief executive's authority as at its nadir, because the official can
rely solely on the officer's express powers under the Constitution minus any relevant legislative branch authority. 181 In this situation,
judges must carefully scrutinize claims to power and should uphold
exclusive presidential authority only if courts disable Congress from
acting on specific matters. 182
Jackson then applied his three-part analytical framework to the
Truman Administration's assertion of executive power for seizing the
steel mills. The Justice promptly eliminated the claim from the initial
category, because the United States government "conceded that no
congressional authorization exists for this seizure." 183 The jurist excluded the assertion with similar expedition from the second classification, as lawmakers had not considered the seizure of industrial enstrongest presumption and the "widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden
of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Id. at 636-37. See also
infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
177. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. See also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text, infra notes 245-46 and
accompanying text.
180. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
181. Id. See also infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
182. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (citation omitted). A claim so conclusive and
preclusive requires scrutiny, as the constitutional system's equilibrium is at stake. Id. at
638. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller, 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(scrutinizing "war power"); Black, supra note 116, at 98.
183. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638. This also would remove the support of many declarations and precedents that were proffered in "relation, and must be confined to, this category." Id. (citation omitted).
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184

terprises an open question. He found senators and representatives
had clearly intended to occupy the field through the prescription of
several statutory procedures that prohibited the government from
seizing and operating the steel companies, processes which the administration had not invoked. 185 Jackson vehemently rejected the notion that congressional failure to legislate with particularity on private
property seizures required or encouraged the chief executive's selec186
tion of a different, inconsistent approach.
The determinations reached above meant the presidential action
must be supported exclusively under the third category's severe strictures, which derive substantiation solely from the executive power
remaining after subtraction of applicable congressional authority over
the area. 187 The Court could uphold the Truman Administration effort only by concluding that the seizure was within the chief executive's purview and beyond the legislative domain; therefore, judicial
review proceeded under circumstances which left claims of presidential authority most susceptible to attack and in the least advantageous
constitutional position. 188
Jackson declared that the Chief Executive does not possess powers which are unmentioned in the Constitution, but the jurist promised that he would give the President's enumerated authority in the
basic document the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be
"reasonable practical implications," instead of the rigidity which a
doctrinaire textualism would dictate. 189 The Justice concomitantly
undertook a rather comprehensive review of the presidential power
that the United States government asserted for seizing American
steel corporations.
Jackson commenced with an examination of the Solicitor General's reliance on three specific clauses which appear in the Executive
Article. The jurist initially rejected the argument that the clause
which vested executive authority in the president comprised a grant
184. See id. at 639. See also supra notes 129-32, 154-57 and accompanying text.
185. When supplying the government's needs, it may seize plants that do not comply
with obligatory orders it placed or use eminent domain to condemn facilities.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (citation omitted). The third situation is when the nation's
general economy requires protection. Id. (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 640. See also supra notes 156-57, infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
187. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640. See also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
188. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640. See also supra note 182 and accompanying text.
189. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640. He rejected a "niggardly construction" as some
clauses could become nearly unworkable and immutable by indulging no "latitude of interpretation for changing times." Id.
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of very expansive executive power; Jackson considered it to allocate
this office generic authority thereafter constitutionally prescribed and
criticized the broad power Truman claimed by analogizing it to the
"prerogatives exercised by George IIl." 190 The Justice similarly negated the assertion premised on the commander-in-chief clause, because the president could effectuate an exponential increase in the official's domination of domestic affairs by committing American
armed forces to what the jurist described as international ventures. 191
Jackson, who assumed for the purposes of argument that the United
States was at war, maintained the Constitution explicitly assigns Con192
gress principal responsibility to supply the nation's armed forces.
The Justice countered governmental dependence on the "take care"
clause in Article II by proffering the Fifth Amendment proscription
which involves deprivations of "life, liberty and property without due
process of law." 193 The jurist found the prohibition demonstrated that
the United States is a "government of laws, not of men [who submit]
194
to rulers only if under rules."
Jackson disparaged the Solicitor General's attempt at premising
the Truman Administration seizure upon "nebulous, inherent powers
never expressly granted" but which ostensibly accrued to the office
from the practices followed by numerous prior chief executives. 195
The jurist contended the loose and irresponsible employment of adjectives colored much legal, and all non-legal, discourse about presidential authority, while observers often use "interchangeably and
without fixed or ascertainable meaning" inherent, implied, incidental,

190. Id. at 640-41. See also infra note 202 and accompanying text.
191. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (citation omitted). See also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 {1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (voicing analogous concerns in a
similar context); supra notes 91, 134-36, infra notes 287, 296 and accompanying text. See
generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
192. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, els. 12-14. He indulged this power little latitude when "turned inward on a labor-industry economic struggle." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645.
193. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646; See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, amend. V; supra
note 140 and accompanying text; infra note 207 and accompanying text.
194. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 646. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137,
163 (1803); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 282 (2001); William Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 4, at
1289; infra note 291 and accompanying text.
195. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646. Justice Jackson described the President's argument
as a plea for power to treat a crisis according to its necessities, the unstated "assumption
being that necessity knows no law." Id.
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plenary, war and emergency powers. 196 The Justice forcefully repudiated the argument that the Supreme Court should discover inherent
authority present for treating national crises, as the Framers had refused to provide explicitly for these particular circumstances in the
Constitution.197 He believed Congress might have afforded, yet decided not to grant, the chief executive substantial emergency power;
therefore, the High Court should refrain from recognizing this type of
authority primarily because the notion lacks any beginning or end. 198
Jackson concluded with a dissertation on modern constitutional
governance at the mid-twentieth century. The Justice determined
that "vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by
the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity;" that the
contemporary chief executive could exert substantial "leverage upon
those who are supposed to check and balance" the official's significant authority, which frequently cancelled their effectiveness; and
that the existing political party system in America exacerbated the
circumstances delineated. 199 These propositions led the jurist to observe that the Supreme Court must not further aggrandize the office
of president, which he asserted was already so powerful and comparatively immune from judicial review, at Congress's expense.200 Jackson
distilled the essence of free government - a concept that American
constitutionalism "is fashioned to fulfill ... so far as humanly possible" - as government "by those impersonal forces which we call
201
law." The Justice declared that the "Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power," that the challenged
endeavor originated in the will of the president and constituted an
"exercise of authority without law," and that the best technique for

196. See id. at 646-47. Accord Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1981).
See also John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, A Comment on the Creation and Resolution of a "Nonproblem:" Dames & Moore v. Regan, The Foreign Affairs Power, and the
Role of the Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1129, 1155 (1981).
197. One exception is the habeas corpus writ's suspension during rebellion or invasion.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650. See also U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 9, cl. 2; supra notes 16-20 and
accompanying text.
198. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 653. See also infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
199. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653-54. For today's Office, see also Martin Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Abner Greene, Checks and Balances
in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994). But see Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 716 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steven Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
200. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (citation omitted). See also supra note 167 and accompanying text.
201. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654-55. See also supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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preserving free government was to have the executive under the substantive law, which parliamentary deliberations formulated. 202 Finally,
the jurist admonished that these venerable institutions, which had
served the United States exceptionally well for such an extended period "may be destined to pass away," but the High Court must be last,
rather than first, to abandon them. 203
In short, Justice Jackson's concurrence enunciated a threepronged framework for evaluating power allocation between the chief
executive and the Congress. That articulation of authority's distribution has become the touchstone which the Supreme Court and legal
commentators have employed to assess separation of powers questions that have arisen since Youngstown's issuance. Presidential
authority is greatest whenever the legislative branch explicitly
authorizes an action and least when lawmakers expressly or implicitly
disavow the effort, while there remains a twilight zone in which concurrent power exists or the distribution of authority is unclear. The
Justice's application of this analytical regime to the steel seizure order
prompted his conclusions that the power asserted by the chief executive was at its lowest ebb and that invalidation of the presidential initiative was appropriate. It is important to remember that Jackson had
served as a prosecutor at Nuremberg and had been the Solicitor General and the Attorney General in the Justice Department during the
Roosevelt Administration, which confronted several national emergencies, namely the great depression and World War II. These experiences made him, as a Justice, keenly aware of the need for swift, efficient governmental action and of the complex, subtle issues that
implicated separation of powers. Moreover, Jackson was a rather
conservative jurist, who was acutely sensitive to actions which might
undermine the Supreme Court's authority and credibility, especially
when resolving disputes over political branch power. Nevertheless,
the Justice was required by constitutional oath and concerns about
the breadth of claims respecting executive authority to rule that the
President had overstepped his power. 204
202. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (no one would know the limits of the power sought
to be asserted or the rights potentially infringed). See also supra note 137-140, 143-45 and
accompanying text.
203. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (citation omitted). See also supra notes 151-53 and
accompanying text.
204. Jackson voiced similar views in cases that involved analogous issues. See supra
notes 182, 191, infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text. See also ROBERT JACKSON,
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); ROBERT JACKSON, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (1955).
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c. Justice Douglas' Opinion
Justice Douglas employed modes of decisionmaking, and expressed sentiments, analogous to those in the opinions that we evaluated above. 205 The central themes in the Douglas concurrence, however, were that the branch of the Federal Government which
possessed constitutional authority to act and the legislative nature of
the Truman initiative. 206 The Justice characterized the Executive Order's purpose as "condemning property [and] a taking in the constitutional sense," while he declared that Congress, the governmental
branch which has the "power to pay compensation for a seizure is the
only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful one that the
President had effected." 207 Moreover, Douglas strongly and clearly
rejected the notion of sanctioning the Truman Administration's
power assertion because the Supreme Court would enlarge and rewrite Article II for the current emergency's political conveniences
and would cede the president legislative authority which the official
simply did not have. 208 The Justice concluded with the observation
that the nation pays dearly for the scheme of checks and balances as
well as separated powers among the three governmental branches, a
price which might appear exorbitant. 209 Nonetheless, the Jurist admonished that the seizure mechanism's employment for what apparently are the most pressing and benign ends at a given historical moment could be transformed into an instrument of oppression in the
future. 210
205. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring). For example, he, like the
opinions' authors stressed separation of powers and distinctions between legislative and
executive authority as well as military affairs and civilian matters. Id. at 629-34. See also
supra notes 134-36, 149, 191 and accompanying text.
206. A decision to apply sanctions, to place the law's force on parties and to direct the
Court's force against them "is an exercise of legislative power." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
630 (Douglas, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 631-32. The condemnation provision in the Fifth Amendment apparently
dictated these propositions, which comported with the perspectives on checks and balances propounded in Justice Black's opinion for the majority. Id. at 632. See also supra
notes 127-44, 193 and accompanying text.
208. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 633 (Douglas J., concurring) (this "step would most assuredly alter the pattern of the Constitution" while rhetorically stating that future generations might "deem it so urgent that the President have legislative authority that the Constitution will be amended").
209. Id. (an inherent risk is stalemates that allow crises to mount and the country to
suffer when the "White House and Capitol Hill" do not cooperate). See also supra notes
161-62 and accompanying text.
210. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 633-34. His approach to legislative silence seems most
sound. Espousal of an "underlying constitutional rule," which invalidated the seizure, ab-
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d. The Opinions of Justice Burton and Justice Clark
We accord comparatively limited treatment to the concurring decision of Justice Harold Burton211 and to the opinion of Justice Tom
Clark, who concurred in the High Court's judgment but not in the
Black opinion for the majority. 212 Neither jurist enunciated particularly new insights. For example, because lawmakers had authorized
specific procedures for the chief executive and reserved the prerogative to decide exactly when seizure might be appropriate, Justice Burton determined that the Truman Administration Executive Order
"invaded the jurisdiction of Congress [and] violated the essence of the
principle of the separation of governmental powers." 213 Justice Clark
similarly found that presidential failure to follow the legislatively prescribed process required the Justice to invalidate the steel seizure
order. 214
4. The Dissenting Opinion in Youngstown

Chief Justice Fred Vinson, whom Justice Stanley Reed and Justice Sherman Minton joined, wrote a dissenting opinion in the
Youngstown case. 215 The three Supreme Court members dissented
because the crucial litigation posed vitally important questions, which
held transcendent significance for Truman's authority and for the
power of future chief executives to address efficaciously crises that
threaten the country.216 The determination by Chief Justice Vinson
consumed a number of pages in the United States Reports, while he
deployed assessment techniques, and reached conclusions, quite difsent Congress' express prior consent, prevents the President from confronting it with a fait
accompli. See TRIBE, supra note 7, at 672. See also WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT
YEARS {1980); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES {1956).
211. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring). See also REHNQUIST, supra
note 2, at 182-83.
212. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660 {Clark, J., concurring) (Clark, like Jackson, had
served as U.S. Attorney General). See also infra note 222 {Clark, like Frankfurter,
evinced regret about invalidating Truman's action). See also supra note 62 and accompanying text. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 183.
·213. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660. See also supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
214. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667. He invoked Justice Joseph Story's advice about judicial review of executive action: the Supreme Court must expound the laws as found in
the records of state and "cannot, when called upon by the citizens of the country, refuse
[its] opinion, however it may differ from that of very great authorities." Id. at 666-67
(citing The Orono, 18 Fed. Cas. No.10, 585 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)).
215. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667 {Vinson, C. J., dissenting). See generally MARCUS,
supra note 2.
216. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667. The dissent also found that no ground could support affirmance.
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ferent from those of his colleagues who were in the majority. Nevertheless, we accord comparatively limited treatment to the dissenting
opinion principally because this decision has not withstood the test of
time.
Chief Justice Vinson initially evaluated the particular factual
context in which President Truman sought to exercise his authority.
The jurist admonished observers who found the situation to implicate
an exceptional assertion of power that the chief executive was responsible for governing in an extraordinary period. 211 Vinson thoroughly
canvassed the relevant developments which had preceded the
Truman Administration's decision to promulgate the order and discovered no basis for questioning the president's determination of an
emergency .218
The jurist then consulted the executive authority granted by the
Constitution and stated that the Framers "deliberately fashioned [the
Presidency] as an office of power and independence. "219 The Chief
Justice accused those who challenged the Executive Order's validity
of seeking to amend the Constitution and claimed that Supreme
Court expansion of the fundamental document was unnecessary because "history and time-honored principles of constitutional law"
supported the Truman Administration seizure.220 Vinson comprehensively reviewed the plethora of previous occasions on which presidents had addressed national emergencies by acting resolutely and
expeditiously to enforce legislative programs or to save congressional
projects until senators and representatives could respond. 221 He contended that this historical survey of executive initiatives could easily
sustain the order seizing the steel mills. 222
The Chief Justice next carefully scrutinized the efforts instituted
by President Truman and found the official had taken care that the
laws were faithfully executed; in particular, the President had fully informed legislators that the officer's endeavors were meant to preserve
217. Id. at 668. See generally THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 372 (1914);
WILLIAM How ARD T AFf, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139-40 (1925).
218. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668-78 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 682. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961). But see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47 & 48, at 301, 308 (James
Madison).
220. See Youngstown, 343 U.S at 683.
221. See id. at 683-700.
222. Id. at 700. Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Clark advised President Truman that
he possessed sufficient authority to seize the steel mills. See DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH,
TRUMAN 896-97 (1992).
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their prerogatives and not to defy congressional will. 223 Vinson saw
little reason for fearing dictatorship or executive tyranny when the
President faithfully implements the laws and maintains the status quo,
until lawmakers have sufficient opportunities to consider and adopt
appropriate responses. 224
The dissenters concluded that judicial, legislative and executive
branch precedents demonstrated President Truman had thoroughly
complied with his responsibilities under the Constitution.225 The three
justices determined the chief executive had promptly notified senators and representatives of the initiative undertaken and had clearly
stated his intention to honor lawmakers' prerogatives, while the dissent declared that "[n]o basis for claims of arbitrary action, unlimited
powers or dictatorial usurpation of congressional power appears from
the facts of this case. "226
D. The Meaning Subsequently Accorded Youngstown

The Supreme Court has rather infrequently relied upon Justice
Hugo Black's opinion for the majority in Youngstown over the ensuing half century. To be sure, on some occasions, the High Court or
individual members have invoked the Black determination principally
for ideas respecting separation of powers. 221 However, the Supreme
223. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 701-04.
224. Id. at 704.
225. Id. at 710. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 135-36, 147-48, 183-84.
226. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 710. See also supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
Truman reflected:
Whatever the six justices [] meant by their differing opinions about the constitutional powers of the President, he must always act in a national emergency....
We live in an age when hostilities begin without polite exchanges of diplomatic
notes. There are no longer sharp distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, between military targets and the sanctuary of civilian areas. Nor can we
separate the economic facts from the problems of defense and security. [The]
President, who is Commander in Chief and who represents the interest of all the
people, must be able to act at all times to meet any sudden threat to the nation's
security.
HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 478 (1956). For
Youngstown's contemporary analysis, see Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A
Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 {1953); Paul Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, The President And The Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141 (1952).
227. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 731, 740 {1971) (White, J.,
concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128-29 (1958). See also United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 972 (2001) (stating that
lower federal courts have applied Youngstown to declare illegal actions directed by executive orders which Presidents Bush and Bill Clinton issued). See generally MARCUS, supra
note 2, at 228-48.
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Court has more often applied the concurrence by Justice Robert
Jackson primarily for the three-part analytical framework, which the
jurist constructed to resolve interbranch disputes between the president and Congress. The phenomenon's quintessential example, and
perhaps the most valuable illustration of subsequent High Court dependence on Youngstown in a rather closely-related context, is the
opinion written by Justice William H. Rehnquist when resolving the
1981 case of Dames & Moore v. Regan.228 This decision has assumed
peculiar importance for several reasons. First, its author not only invoked the Jackson concurrence but also instructively explained, and
expanded on, the framework for evaluation propounded. Moreover,
Justice Rehnquist served as a judicial law clerk for Justice Jackson
during the October 1951 Term when the Supreme Court issued
Youngstown. 229 Furthermore, Rehnquist became Chief Justice of the
United States a half decade after penning the determination in Dames
& Moore, and the jurist will probably preside over the High Court
that would resolve challenges to the November 13 Executive Order.
In the Dames & Moore v. Regan case, petitioners attacked President Jimmy Carter's order which nullified certain attachments of Iranian property, required that individuals who held blocked Iranian securities and funds transfer those assets to the New York Federal
Reserve Bank and eventually Iran, as well as suspended pending
claims against Iran and relegated litigants which pursued them to an
international claims tribunal; the chief executive proffered five different sources of explicit and implied power as support for the initiative.230 Justice Rehnquist initially remarked that the parties and the
lower federal courts in the Dames & Moore lawsuit all denominated
the Youngstown opinion as the source of considerable applicable
analysis. 231 The jurist briefly alluded to the decision written for the
Court by Justice Black, which recognized that the chief executive's
authority, if any relevant power existed, must derive from a federal

228. 435 U.S. 654 (1981). See generally Symposium, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 29
UCLA L. REV. 977-1159 (1982); KOH, supra note 112, at 138-43, 197-98.
229. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 2-20; Arthur S. Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A
Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1104, 1109 n.27 (1981); Nowak &
Rotunda, supra note 196, at 1156.
230. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See generally Nowak & Rotunda, supra
note 196.
231. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (invoking the proposition about the federal judiciary as the nation's "overseer" propounded by Justice Frankfurter, supra note 151 and
accompanying text).
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232

statute or from the United States Constitution.
Rehnquist then observed that the concurring determination
authored by Justice Jackson had expounded in a comparatively generalized manner the "consequences of different types of interaction
between the two democratic branches in assessing Presidential
authority to act in any given case." 233 Justice Rehnquist afforded a lucid, succinct rendition of Jackson's three-pronged framework, while
the jurist quoted extensively from the concurrence which Jackson
. y oungstown. 234
era f te d m
Justice Rehnquist remarked that the Supreme Court had on earlier occasions, and in Dames & Moore, considered analytically helpful
Jackson's organizational schematic, which parsed executive initiatives
into three general classifications. 235 Nevertheless, Rehnquist stated
that even Jackson characterized those categories as "a somewhat
oversimplified grouping," 236 while Rehnquist reminded his colleagues
of the Holmesian admonition, which Justice Frankfurter had reproduced in the jurist's Youngstown concurrence.237 Justice Rehnquist,
accordingly, instructed that any individual presidential action ranges
somewhere along a broad spectrum from explicit congressional
authorization to express legislative proscription, rather than fits
"neatly in one of three pigeonholes," especially when the chief executive is treating international emergencies which the members of Congress could not have anticipated. 238
Having proffered this informative explication and elaboration of
Jackson's triadic formulation that addresses interbranch disputes
which implicate power, Justice Rehnquist ultimately relied on the
analytical construct in essence as articulated by the Youngstown concurrence to resolve the contested question of presidential authority
232. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668. See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. See
generally supra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
233. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668. See also id. at 660 (invoking several important
historical propositions propounded by Justice Jackson, supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text).
234. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-669. See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38
(Jackson, J., concurring).
235. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See also supra notes 174-87 and accompanying
text.
236. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson,
J., concurring). See generally supra note 174 and accompanying text.
237. Justice Holmes observed that the Constitution's great ordinances do not "establish and divide fields of black and white." Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669. See also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
238. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669.
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presented.
Because Rehnquist ascertained that Carter had acted
with explicit legislative approval when the chief executive promulgated the order which nullified attachments and transferred assets,
the jurist accorded the endeavors the strongest presumptions and
broadest latitude of judicial construction while litigants that chal240
lenged these efforts assumed a substantial burden of persuasion.
When Rehnquist applied the strict tests which he had gleaned from
Jackson's first category, the jurist observed that the petitioners had
not satisfied the formidable requirements delineated, and a contrary
determination would have meant the "Federal Government as a
whole lacked the power exercised by the President," a perspective
which the members of the Court refused to countenance. 241
Justice Rehnquist also acknowledged that chief executives' initiatives which eliminated federal court jurisdiction to resolve cases and
controversies in contravention of Article III or congressional legisla242
However, the jurist found the Carter Adtion would be invalid.
ministration order did "not divest the federal court of 'jurisdiction"'
but only purported "to 'suspend' the claims"243 and, therefore, the
situation exemplified the "difference between modifying federalcourt jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a different rule of
law." 244 Rehnquist concomitantly asserted that the President had exercised authority, "acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims and [,
thus,] simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the
lawsuit," 245 while the jurist considered several enactments as suggesting indirect legislative "acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this case. "246
239. See id. at 674. See also supra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
240. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)). See also Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 196, at 1156; supra notes
175-76 and accompanying text.
241. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (Jackson, J ., concurring)). See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
242. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684. See also Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 196, at
1158.
243. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684.
244. Id. at 685 (citation omitted).
245. Id. at 685. He analogized this acquiescence to, and cited, ideas in Frankfurter's
Youngstown opinion. Id. at 686. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 252; supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
246. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677. He avoided admitting the holding would allow
the president to present Congress with the type of fait accompli implicitly rejected by
Youngstown, but the results can be reconciled by not treating the transferred claims as
"takings." TRIBE, supra note 7, at 675. Other 20th century foreign affairs cases have also
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In sum, the Supreme Court has generally followed the approach
which the majority espoused in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer and has not relied on the dissent, while the High Court has
more frequently invoked Justice Jackson's concurrence than the
opinions of Justice Black or the other members who concurred. We
consider Dames & Moore v. Regan to be the most relevant
Youngstown progeny, while Justice Rehnquist developed, but did not
employ, a useful gloss on the Jackson three-part framework when resolving the dispute. Dames & Moore appears in tension with
Youngstown, particularly to the extent the earlier decision concludes
the applicable legislative activity might require that Congress expressly authorize presidential initiatives; however, these dimensions
247
Moreover, Dames & Moore warof the cases can be reconciled.
rants a narrow reading, as Justice Rehnquist carefully admonished, 248
while the unique situation presented by the critical need to secure
release of the hostages held in Iran confines and explains the determination. The fourth section applies Youngstown to the Bush Order.

IV. Why the Bush Order Fails the Youngstown Test
This part of the article scrutinizes the Bush Administration Executive Order in light of the analytical framework enunciated by
Youngstown, considering Justice Black's opinion for the Supreme
Court, the separate decisions which the concurring Justices wrote,
and the subsequent Dames & Moore case. We conclude that the
Bush Order fails the Youngstown test, at least insofar as the directive
purportedly authorizes indefinite detention of non-citizens and denies
covered individuals federal court access.
Our treatment begins with a restatement of the Youngstown determination's controlling rationale, derived from synthesizing the
various opinions penned by the six Justices who concurred in the substantive result. We then apply the approach to the Executive Order,
exploring the directive's provisions, which govern the detention of
suspected terrorists and federal court jurisdiction, in the context of
how Congress expressed its will on those subjects both before and af-

not required presidents to have Congress' express approval. Id. at 675-76.
247. See supra note 246. See also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2320 (2001) (applying Youngstown to the modern administrative
state); Percival, supra note 227 (same).
248. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661 ("We attempt to lay down no general 'guidelines' covering other situations [and] to confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the case.").
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ter President Bush promulgated the order on November 13, 2001.
The section also examines and rejects the claim that the Constitution
grants the Chief Executive the authority to detain suspects and prescribe jurisdiction, even when presidential actions contravene apparent legislative will. The part next assesses the order's provisions
through the separate Youngstown decisions authored by Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson and Douglas, to the extent the concurrences
might employ evaluative methods distinct from our synthesis of what
Youngstown held.
A. Youngstown's Analytical Framework

We acknowledged above that the precise holding in Youngstown
resists felicitous delineation, principally because there are numerous
and somewhat diverse concurring opinions. Nevertheless, it is possible to articulate a fair, clear, synthetic approach to Justice Black's determination for the Court and the decisions that the concurring Justices wrote. Our study of the Truman Administration steel seizure
order; the directive's historical, and especially its legislative, milieu;
the opinions of the six Justices who found the order unconstitutional;
and subsequent judicial and academic commentary related to the determination suggest that Youngstown's essential meaning can be
enunciated in terms of five fundamental propositions.
First, when a court analyzes whether an executive order comprises executive branch lawmaking that violates the Constitution, the
court should determine whether the challenged directive furthers
congressional will. Second, when ascertaining legislative will on a
particular subject, the court should assess strong indicia of this will,
such as recent congressional denials of executive branch requests for
legislation, and is not restricted to the language of enacted statutes.
Third, if the court decides that the executive order comports with the
lawmakers' will on the specific issue, it ought to deem the directive a
valid exercise of the executive power granted the president by Article
II, so long as the matter is one for which the Constitution prescribes
any federal authority. Fourth, should the court determine that the
executive order violates congressional will, expressed in a passed
statute or implied from prior legislative refusal to enact laws, the
court will sustain the order only if the subject is one which Article II
of the Constitution commits to the president, acting alone. 249 Fifth,
when considering whether Article II delegates a matter solely to the

249. See supra notes 181-82, 187-88 and accompanying text.
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chief executive, the court should evaluate claims that the document
does so in light of constitutional text and history which support the
contrary conclusion - that Article I or any relevant Amendments assign Congress legislative powers over the subject.
B. Applying this Framework to the Bush Order

Application of this framework for analysis to the provisions of
the Bush Order that authorize indefinite detention and preclude any
federal judicial review of actions taken under the Order compels the
conclusion that these provisions are unconstitutional. First, if a court
applied our initial two propositions, it would find that the provisions
contravene recent expressions of congressional will on both topics.
As explained above, in the weeks following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration sought legislation that would
authorize the indefinite detention of non-citizens certified by the At250
torney General to be suspected of international terrorism. This request provoked vigorous opposition voiced by senators and representatives in each political party. 251 The Bush Administration first
insisted that it never intended the apparent meaning of the draft bill
the Administration had tendered to Congress, then resubmitted substantially the same language, and finally acquiesced in the phrasing of
Senate Bill 1510, which limited non-citizen detentions to seven days,
absent the filing of criminal charges or the initiation of deportation
proceedings.252 Legislators also assiduously preserved meaningful
federal judicial scrutiny of "any action or decision relating to this section[,] including judicial review of the merits of" the Attorney General's certification that the officer had reasonable grounds for believing the non-citizen was a terrorist or otherwise a national security
threat. 253
Congress' decision to preserve judicial review of non-citizen detentions alone would sufficiently evidence the importance which
lawmakers accorded federal court oversight of executive branch actions to support an inference that legislators would have also rejected
the Bush Order's language which proscribed judicial review alto-

250. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 64- 72 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. One way that Congress ensured federal
judicial review would be a realistic option for non-citizen detainees was to reject the Administration's request that detainees file petitions for habeas corpus in the District of Columbia federal courts. See also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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gether. It bears emphasis that the Administration never proffered a
proposal which would have prevented any person whom the directive
covered from seeking federal judicial review, to Senate and House
members but rather asserted the notion for the first time in the Executive Order. There, in fact, is an additional, perhaps clearer, indication that Congress would not enact a statute that so limits federal
courts access. The bill that Senate Judiciary Chair Leahy introduced
explicitly required that any non-citizen subjected to trial in a military
commission be granted an appeal as of right to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Services, with an opportunity for
further review in the United States Supreme Court by petition for a
writ of certiorari. 254
Insofar as this legislative history differs from the one the
Youngstown majority and concurring opinions considered to evidence
congressional disapproval of Truman's steel industry seizure, we believe the developments which transpired in fall 2001 and winter 2002
even more forcefully demonstrate that the Bush Order violates the
legislative will, especially in terms of contemporaneity and clarity.
The Youngstown Court primarily relied upon a prior Congress' rejection of an executive branch request for seizure authority five years
before the crisis that precipitated the Truman Order and three years
before the United States entered the Korean conflict. During September 2001, however, the Bush Administration approached lawmakers in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, when
the circumstances that ostensibly justified the extreme measures
sought were clear to legislators and the American public. Even so,
senators and representatives, aware of the extant dangers and risking
political opprobrium,255 flatly rejected the Bush Administration's request for the power to detain non-citizens indefinitely and vehemently resisted efforts to circumscribe federal judicial review of the
limited detention authority granted.256 The Bush Order concomitantly
prompted clear, sharp challenges from congressional leaders, a series
of Senate Judiciary Committee hearings that documented constitutional objections to the directive, and proposed legislation, introduced
independently in both houses of Congress, which sought to control
executive branch deployment of the military tribunals that the Order
instituted. In contrast, Truman's request for legislative ratification of

254. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
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his steel seizure order elicited no congressional response. The recent record is as powerful as, if not stronger than, the developments
which supported the Youngstown majority's conclusion that the
Truman Order contravened lawmakers' will.
Second, a court applying our recommended framework for assessment would then consider proposition four, because the third
proposition is irrelevant to executive orders which conflict with legislative will. The only grant of constitutional authority even arguably
applicable to the Bush Order, and the sole one that the directive invokes, is in Article II, which designates the president as "commanderin-chief" of the United States armed forces. 258 Truman similarly
placed great reliance on this power when substantiating his steel seizure order.259 Integral to the Youngstown Court's finding that the
Truman Order exceeded the president's commander-in-chief authority was its conclusion, which our fifth proposition reflects: constitutional text and history revealed Congress, not the president, was the
political branch of the federal government accorded primary responsibility to take domestic private property when the public good required it. In reaching this determination, the Justices relied upon the
Constitution's delegation of the lawmaking power to Congress,260 the
document's assignment of the principal role for supplying the armed
forces to the legislative branch,261 the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
on the deprivation of "property without due process of law," 262 and
the requirement for "just compensation" to be paid the owners of
private property taken for the public good. 263
The Youngstown precedent also compels the conclusion that the
provisions of the Bush Order which we have identified as constitutionally suspect do, indeed, overstep the authority of the president
when acting as commander-in-chief. Constitutional language and history demonstrate that Congress, rather than the president, is the political branch entrusted with the prescription of federal court jurisdic-

257. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
258. See Bush Order, supra note 3.
259. See supra notes 1, 113, 134-36, 191-92 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 128-45 and accompanying text (discussing Black's opinion for the
Court in Youngstown). See also supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 166-204 and accompanying text (discussing Jackson's Youngstown
concurrence).
262. See id. See also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text (discussing Douglas's Youngstown
concurrence).
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264

tion. Article III expressly delegates lawmakers the power for making "Exceptions" to the appellate jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court.265 Moreover, the High Court has lopg construed the
Article I and III provisions that authorize Congress to ordain and establish "from time to time" such "inferior Courts"266 as it deems appropriate to grant legislators the lesser power to create lower federal
courts of limited jurisdiction.267 Thus, the Bush Order's provisions
which authorize indefinite detention of non-citizens, thereby precluding relief that might otherwise be available through the habeas
corpus writ, and which expressly eliminate federal court power to
hear claims pursued by or on behalf of those individuals who are
subject to the Order, even more substantially invade the constitutional province of Congress than did President Truman's steel seizure
initiative. Hence, we conclude that these provisions in the Bush Order violate the Constitution.
1. Applying the Separate Concurring Opinions to the Bush Order

We believe that our synthetic approach to Justice Black's opinion for the Court and the decisions of the other five Justices who held
the Truman Administration Executive Order unconstitutional is a
fair, clear reading of Youngstown. This interpretation has withstood
exacting scrutiny over the last fifty years. Yet, even if a court eschewed our evaluative framework, President Bush's recent assertion
of authority would not satisfy the various ratio decidendi of the remaining Justices who concurred.
The Jackson concurrence is most important in assessing the Bush
Order, partly because of its frequent, subsequent invocation, especially then-Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the decision in Dames &
Moore. 268 Application of the Jackson concurring opinion to the Bush
Order's provisions that mandate indefinite detention and proscribe

264. See supra notes 20-48 and accompanying text (discussing Article III provisions
and Supreme Court caselaw establishing Congress' role in creating the federal courts and
delineating their respective jurisdictions).
265. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See also supra notes 20-33 and accompanying
text {discussing relevant caselaw interpreting this provision).
266. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (e~powering
Congress "To constitute (t]ribunals inferior to the supreme Court"). See generally supra
notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text {discussing relevant caselaw).
268. See supra notes 166-70, 228-46 and accompanying text (discussing the enduring
significance of Justice Jackson's concurrence and the determination's relevance to the
Dames & Moore case).
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any federal judicial intervention would yield the conclusion that they
are unconstitutional. For the previously-discussed reasons, which
show those provisos contravene legislative will, 269 Justice Jackson
would have situated the provisions within his third category, when
executive power is at its nadir. Jackson's Youngstown concurrence
also teaches that the federal courts must rigorously scrutinize presidential claims of authority within this classification, and impose substantial burdens on parties which proffer the assertions and uphold
the power only if the Constitution disables Congress from acting on
the matters. 210 Justice Jackson would probably have concluded that
the Bush Order's questionable provisos could not satisfy these stringent tests, in particular because the Constitution explicitly assigns
lawmakers the power and the responsibility for prescribing federal
211
judicial jurisdiction.
The decision that Justice Rehnquist authored in Dames & Moore
would have similar applicability to the Bush Order. Even if a court
viewed the President's assertions of authority for detaining indefinitely non-citizen suspects and for proscribing federal judicial jurisdiction along the spectrum developed by the Rehnquist gloss on the
Jackson concurring determination, rather than as within one of Jackson's three discrete groupings, the claims would be considerably
nearer an express legislative prohibition than an explicit congressional authorization. 272
Application of the remaining Youngstown concurrences would
yield analogous results. Nonetheless, we accord those opinions comparatively limited treatment here, as the decisions have less relevance
for the issues that the Bush Order raised, partly due to their somewhat infrequent citation and to the passage of time. For example,
Justice Felix Frankfurter's firm conclusion that Congress had withheld seizure power from President Truman273 strongly suggests the jurist would find lawmakers had not granted President Bush authority
for detaining non-citizen suspects indefinitely and for suspending all
269. See supra notes 57-105 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 166-204 and accompanying text (analyzing Jackson's Youngstown

concurrence).
271. Sqpra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
272. Again, the reasons we give above for finding that the Bush Order's relevant provisions conflict with congressional will, see supra notes 57-105 and accompanying text,
support characterization of those provisions as nearing the express-congressionalproscription end of Justice Rehnquist's spectrum of presidential power.
273. See supra notes 148-65 and accompanying text (discussing Frankfurter's
Youngstown concurrence).
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judicial review of actions taken under the Order, even in the absence
of a specific legislative enactment. Just as Justice William 0. Douglas
determined that the governmental branch with the "power to pay
compensation for a seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure
or make lawful one that the President has effected," 274 he would similarly conclude that the Constitution's commitment to Congress of the
power for establishing the federal judiciary and prescribing its jurisdiction excluded unilateral presidential abrogation of federal court
jurisdiction that lawmakers had statutorily granted. 275
In sum, under either our proffered synthesis of the various
Youngstown opinions or the analytical techniques applied in the separate concurrences, the Bush Administration Executive Order does
not pass constitutional muster, to the extent the directive purportedly
authorizes the indefinite detention of non-citizens and proscribes the
exercise of federal judicial jurisdiction provided by legislation. We
appreciate that some readers could misunderstand our conclusions,
because the constitutional questions which the Bush Order presents
and application of the Youngstown precedent to these issues are simultaneously complex and subtle. Thus, the article's final section attempts to anticipate numerous, possible ways that observers might
improperly construe the views we espouse, to clarify those perspectives, and to identify the broader, enduring ramifications of the admittedly narrow claims that our arguments support.

V. Limiting Clarifications and Broader Implications
A. What we do not Contend

This part emphasizes the narrowness of the determinations that
we have reached by applying Youngstown to the Bush Order. Our
focus has been the provisions that ostensibly permit indefinite detention and preclude federal judicial relief. Therefore, we proffered no
assertions regarding other aspects of the directive. More specifically,
the analysis provided does not require the conclusion that the Chief
Executive lacked power to promulgate the Order's important provisions authorizing military tribunals to try alleged war crimes which
274. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 631-32 (Douglas, J., concurring).
275. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (arguing that the Constitution's
delegation to Congress of the duty to create and limit federal court jurisdiction required
the conclusion that this same authority was not also within the President's power as commander-in-chief). The ideas that we examined above would similarly apply to Justices
Harold Burton and Tom Clark. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
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specific individuals responsible for the September 11 attacks committed. Our article acknowledges the strength of claims that submitting
the trial of persons accused with war crimes to military commissions
invokes a tradition of earlier presidents, who exercised their constitutional power as commanders-in-chief,276 and that Congress has preserved this conventional executive prerogative by statute. 277 In light
of these contentions, we assume for the purposes of argument that the
President may create military tribunals without express legislative
authorization, a contested issue on which our paper expresses no
opinion.278
Despite the concerns surveyed, the Bush Order's additional assertions of power to detain suspects indefinitely, whether or not they
are tried, and to prohibit all judicial review of the directive or any actions implemented under it merit separate constitutional scrutiny.
Indeed, for the reasons articulated in section four, we believe that the
Order's provisions, which allow unlimited detention of non-citizens
and nullify federal court jurisdiction granted by statute, unconstitutionally intrude upon legislative authority delegated to Congress. It
bears reiteration that our firm conviction respecting invalidity encompasses only the most extreme provisions included in the directive.
We similarly underscore that the argument which challenges the
constitutionality of the Bush Order's jurisdiction-stripping provision279
preserves only that federal court jurisdiction and those rights and
remedies which federal law otherwise affords, whatever their extent.
Our article leaves unresolved potentially salient questions about the

276. See, e.g., ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 2-6; Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 250-52. See generally WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY
GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 351-69 (3d ed., rev. 1914); David J. Bederman, Article
II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825 (1993); Paust, supra note 10.
277. See ABA REPORT & RECOMMENDATION, supra note 14, at 2-6. See also Bush
Order, supra note 3 (citing Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 21, codified at 28
U.S.C. § 821, as authority for the Order); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 253;
Dinh, supra note 19, at 405; Feldman, supra note 19, at 471-72.
278. Compare George Lardner Jr., Democrats Blast Order on Tribunals; Senators Told
Military Trials Fall Under President's Power, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A22 (reporting Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff's testimony that President Bush had
power to authorize trial by military commissions absent congressional action or approval),
with 148 CONG. REC. S741 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Military
tribunals may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but only if they are backed by
specific congressional authorization.") (emphasis added); Katya! & Tribe, supra note 4, at
1388-93 (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 821 does not supply authority for the Bush Order), and
Paust, supra note 10, at 9 (same). See also U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 9 (empowering Congress "To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court").
279. See Bush Order,supra note 3, § 7(b).
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availability, under existing statutes, of the habeas corpus writ to par280
ticular individuals detained outside of United States territory. We
do not address whether persons who are subject to the Bush Order
and can somehow invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court might
have meritorious substantive claims for relief from any or all of the
directive's provisions or from specific actions that the Administration
institutes under the Order. The issues receive no treatment here principally because they are beyond this paper's scope and partly because
predicting which of myriad factual scenarios will actually arise and be
litigated is difficult. In short, the article shows merely that the provision in the Bush Order which attempts to eliminate federal court jurisdiction is an invalid usurpation of congressional power.
Our research finds that the Constitution authorizes the legislative
branch, rather than the Chief Executive, to prescribe the federal judiciary's jurisdiction, and that the Constitution imposes limitations on
the power granted. It may well be that lawmakers can no more supplant federal court jurisdiction by statute than President Bush is able
to attain a similar result through executive order. Even if Congress
ratified the Bush directive's provisions that deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction and indefinitely detain non-citizens, the legislation
adopted would raise serious constitutional doubts, although this
sharply-contested, intractable question also exceeds the paper's compass.281 In any event, our contention here is simply that those provisos
in the Bush Order violate the Constitution because they exceed the
Chief Executive's authority when acting alone.
Finally, we do not question the good faith of President Bush or
other executive branch officials, challenge the need for an efficacious
response to terrorism, or minimize the grievous losses inflicted in the
terrorist attacks or in subsequent efforts implemented when combating terrorism. The Bush Administration acted out of understandable,
laudatory concerns about treating in the strongest feasible manner
the horrific terrorist strikes and the continuing threat of attacks.
Nonetheless, as Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence admonished, the United States must resist "the infirmity of confusing the issue of a power's validity with the cause it is invoked to promote." 282
280. See supra note 10 (discussing issues raised, but not resolved, in the Eisentrager
litigation).
281. See Katya) & Tribe, supra note 4, at 1334-35 {identifying serious Due Process concerns raised by Order's denial of appeal right to an entity independent of executive).
Cf supra note 33 (citing cases and commentary concerning constitutional limits on Congress' power to restrict federal court jurisdiction).
282. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also id. at 594 {Frank-
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1. Broader Implications of the Bush Order

Justice Jackson concomitantly warned of the strong "tendency []
to emphasize transient results upon policies ... and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of our Republic. "283 The subpart above stressed the narrow character of the determinations proffered. We also acknowledged that a federal court
could well find future litigation contesting the Bush Order warrants
dismissal based upon a jurisdictional defect wholly independent of the
directive's jurisdiction-stripping provision or might address the merits
and consider the administration's commitment of war crimes (among
other) allegations to military tribunals to be a valid application of the
President's commander-in-chief power. Because our conclusion is
limited in nature, some readers may question its significance. We believe, however, the present assertion of executive authority to detain
non-citizens indefinitely and to suspend the exercise of federal judicial jurisdiction threatens "the balanced power structure of our Republic" with "enduring" harm.
If President Bush possesses the power for eliminating federal
court review of actions pursued under the November order, what
would prevent future chief executives from recurring to this same
authority whenever they perceive or allege the existence of new
emergencies? 284 Granting the Bush Administration's apparent assumption that the presidential role as commander-in-chief permits the
officer to preclude all judicial interference with the war on terrorism's
prosecution, even insofar as suspects arrested domestically are concerned, it would seem to follow that chief executives could suspend
federal court jurisdiction anytime its exercise niight frustrate military
efforts. In light of modern warfare's realities, which pit not only soldier against soldier but also the economic and technological development of nation against nation, the presidential power to proscribe
federal judicial jurisdiction would, indeed, cover an extensive spectrum of cases and controversies. 285 We submit that here, as with
furter, J., concurring) (stating "[t]he accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day
[but] slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that
fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority").
283. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also infra text accompanying note 295.
284. See generally ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987) (concluding that governmental powers first asserted in a time of crisis are often stabilized and resorted to even after the crisis
has subsided); infra note 295 and accompanying text.
285. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
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Youngstown, such a sweeping conceptualization of the commanderin-chief's authority directly contravenes Justice Black's declaration
that the "Constitution [did] not subject th[e] lawmaking power of
Congress to presidential or military supervision or control." 286 This
perception similarly conflicts with Justice Jackson's statement that
"the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in
Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants."287 James
Madison correspondingly observed in The Federalist No 47: "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the
same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 288
When, as here, the authority claimed is the power to shelter the
president's own executive orders and other instructions from any judicial consideration, the danger of future abuse seems even greater
than in Youngstown. The United States enjoys a venerable, but simultaneously fragile, tradition that its governmental officials are not
above, but rather subject to, the law. 289 Throughout American history, the federal courts have vigilantly guaranteed that those officers,
including chief executives, stayed within lawful bounds. 290 Recognition of presidential authority (in addition to, and distinct from, that of

57 (1981); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Def.,
34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
286. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. See also supra notes 134-36, 139, 141 and accompanying text.
287. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776) (charging that the King has "affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power"); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 19 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (concluding that this clause restricts
the military's power); supra notes 91, 134-36, 191-92 and accompanying text.
288. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 219, at 301 (James Madison). See also Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11 (1957) (declaring that the "blending of executive, legislative, and
judicial powers in one person or even in one branch of government is ordinarily regarded
as the very acme of absolutism"); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting) (proclaiming that the Founders "were opposed to governments that
placed in the hands of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws").
289. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 219, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasizing that the president, unlike a monarch, is subject to the rule of law). For examples,
see supra notes 164, 214.
290. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997) (observing that "we have long
held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine
whether he has acted within the law"). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974); supra notes 164, 190, 214 and accompanying text.
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Congress )291 for dispensing with the salutary check afforded by the review of an independent, co-equal federal judiciary, jeopardizes a
principle dramatically more fundamental than the separation of powers, namely "that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that
we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules." 292
For these reasons, even if searching federal court review of detention decisions and related initiatives undertaken pursuant to the
Bush Order invalidates no single Administration action, we believe
judicial scrutiny has intrinsic value. Therefore, the Chief Executive
must eschew the directive's provisions that authorize indefinite detention of non-citizens, thereby submitting to federal habeas corpus review the lawfulness of any challenged custody. The Bush Administration should consult and follow the World War II example that
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt set in Quirin. The Roosevelt
Administration did not invoke the proviso in its military commissions
proclamation which denied accused persons federal court access; instead, the administration submitted to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and, accordingly, permitted federal judicial review of military trials. 293 President Bush and executive branch officials have thus far
exhibited commendable restraint, especially by prosecuting several
high-profile defendants in federal court, rather than in military tribunals.294 Should the Administration modify this practice and ignore the
Roosevelt precedent, a federal court, in an appropriate case, would
have the power and the duty to hold unconstitutional the Executive
Order's most extreme features.

291. See supra notes 21-48 and accompanying text.
292. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 646 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also supra note 194 and
accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 17, 19, 85. See also Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25
HARV. J. L & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-59 (2002); Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001 at Al4. We emphatically disavow the Roosevelt administration's discredited actions recounted, and approved, in the case of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also supra note 191 and accompanying
text, infra note 296 and accompanying text.
294. See Dan Eggen & Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Won't Seek Death for Walker, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al; David Johnston & Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The
Government's Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al; Steven Lubet, editorial, A Muslim
Lawyer for Moussaoui, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2002, at A31; Katherine Q. Seelye, Lindh
Lawyers and Prosecutors Spar Over Secret Witness, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at Al8;
Philip Shenon, Sept. 11 Defendant Who Wants to Represent Self Is Busy Doing So, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at A22. See also Winging it at Guantanamo, supra note 15; U.S.
Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, supra note 78.
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VI. Conclusion
President George W. Bush responded to the heinous September
11 terrorist attacks by issuing an Executive Order that not only
authorized military commissions to try individuals whom the United
States prosecutes domestically for crimes implicating terrorism but
also denied these persons access to federal court. President Bush's
assertion of power usurps legislative authority that the Constitution
expressly grants Congress to establish the judiciary and delineate its
jurisdiction. We urge the Bush Administration to forego reliance on
the provision that ostensibly precludes federal courts from reviewing
detentions or military commission judgments under the Order. This
claim to power would undermine legislative and judicial authority,
threatening the delicate balance among the federal government's
branches.
President Bush should heed the trenchant admonitions uttered in
closely-related contexts more than one half century ago by Justice
Robert Jackson, a preeminent American jurist. Jackson astutely
warned:
[The] vague, undefined and undefinable 'war power' [is] the
most dangerous one to free government in the whole catalogue
of powers [, because] [i]t usually is invoked in haste and excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult [and] [i]t is executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation unpopular. 295
President Bush must similarly reject the principle of executive branch
supremacy which "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand
of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need" 296 and upon which the Bush Administration has seized, as this
295. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) ("It would indeed be ironic if, in
the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties ... which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.") See generally TRIBE, supra
note 7, at 669-70; supra note 182, supra note 284 and accompanying text.
296. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963):
The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights ... under the gravest of
emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit
governmental action.
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866) ("No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any [constitutional]
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.") See generally supra notes 191, 293 and accompanying text.
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precept's application could jeopardize the Constitution that has
served the United States exceptionally well for two centuries.297

297. With all due respect, the failure to follow the sage advice proffered by Justice
Jackson could warrant comparison between George Bush and President Truman, whose
assertion of power for seizing U.S. steel mills the jurist analogized to the "prerogatives exercised by George III." See supra note 190 and accompanying text.

